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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
 In the wake of the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Nebraskans experienced a 
dramatic increase in the price of motor fuels. Although Nebraska was not impacted directly by 
the physical effects of these storms, damage to critical production, refining, and transportation 
facilities in the Gulf Coast region sent shock waves throughout the country. Attorney General 
Jon Bruning convened this task force for the purpose of studying these price movements and to 
analyze whether price-gouging activity may be occurring. 
Motor vehicle fuels are a vital commodity. Businesses and consumers depend on a 
network of oil producers, refiners, and retailers and an extensive transportation system to provide 
these fuels for daily use. This network extends far beyond Nebraska borders and links oil 
producers, refiners, retailers, and consumers across the entire globe.  
Careful scrutiny of the pricing and delivery of petroleum products is not a singular 
phenomenon limited to Nebraska. On a federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
regularly examines the petroleum industry to address concerns about concentration in production 
and refining and issues affecting retail pricing. Other states also have undertaken investigations, 
with Florida recently concluding a study addressing antitrust concerns in that state. These studies 
have not found violations of law, and they generally have found competitive markets affected by 
worldwide conditions. Growing global demand has led to increasing dependence on imported 
crude oil products, and disruptions in supplies–whether from political or natural causes–quickly 
are assimilated into market prices on a worldwide scale.  
This study is unique in focusing on Nebraska markets. No refineries currently operate in 
Nebraska. Motor fuels for sale in retail establishments in Nebraska come primarily through 
pipelines, which depend heavily on refinery operations in the Gulf Coast region for supplies. An 
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extensive network of retail establishments serves Nebraska consumers and businesses, but these 
retailers generally can be characterized as price takers dependent upon other suppliers for their 
inventory. After laying a foundation for understanding national price trends, this study analyzes 
price data from a sample of establishments throughout different geographic regions of the state. 
This analysis focuses on price and gross margin behavior during a period of approximately one 
year, including the months immediately preceding and following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
This study begins with a discussion of legal questions that are basic to defining price 
gouging. After analyzing the general principles for price determination in a market economy, 
Part 1 outlines legal constraints from both federal and state law that affect price-setting 
functions. It compares statutes from other states with Nebraska law and examines the concept of 
unconscionability in proscribing certain commercial behavior. It concludes that retail price 
behavior in Nebraska is unlikely to meet a standard of unconscionability under the current 
Nebraska statute.  
Part 2 examines U.S. Energy Information Agency data to determine factors contributing 
to volatility in oil and refined gasoline prices. Additionally, we investigate the profitability of 
twenty-one major independent oil companies during the period before and after the hurricanes 
struck. 
Part 3 examines gasoline and diesel price fluctuations in individual Nebraska cities both 
before and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast region. We examine how 
prices in Nebraska react to the natural disasters in the Gulf Coast. We also examine whether any 
particular brands (or stations) commonly led price increases and declines in Nebraska cities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Laws Affecting Motor Fuel Pricing 
• Motor fuel prices generally are unregulated. Various state and federal laws, including 
antitrust and consumer protection laws, affect the environment in which price setting 
occurs. These laws facilitate the interaction of supply and demand forces in a competitive 
market.  
 
• So-called price gouging presents special concerns in defining the appropriate scope of 
government intervention in the price-setting function. Disrupting price changes through 
restrictions or controls can adversely affect the flow of goods and services. On the other 
hand, disruptions in the supply chain associated with emergency situations implicate 
other policy considerations beside allocation inefficiencies, which may justify some form 
of intervention. 
 
• Whether government intervention is justified is debatable, and that debate involves 
competing value claims. In some states, specific statutes provide a basis for governmental 
intervention to address “price gouging” in emergency situations. Congress also is 
considering proposed legislation in this area. Definitional concerns about “price gouging” 
make implementation problematic. Antitrust laws provide the basis for consumer 
protection over the longer term. 
 
• Nebraska law leaves considerable doubt as to whether any remedial action is justifiable in 
response to increased motor fuel prices. Nebraska law relies on the general constraint of 
unconscionability, which long has been a matter for legal uncertainty in contract matters.  
 
• To the extent the Unicameral wishes to adopt more specific legislation, some lessons may 
be drawn from the laws of other states. Such legislation should ensure that changes in 
replacement costs are considered in formulating a safe harbor for sellers. This is 
particularly important in a business such as gasoline retailing, where volatility in prices 
affects the profitability of firms in up and down markets. Limiting the context of any 
legal constraints on price setting to situations involving emergencies where natural 
disasters or similar disruptions directly are affecting Nebraska consumers is advisable. 
Sellers and consumers deserve fair notice of the rules that will be applied. 
 
Analysis of Motor Fuel Markets and Firms 
• Based on advanced statistical techniques, increases in the price of a barrel of oil 
accounted for 62.5 percent of the rise in the gasoline prices between June 2004 and 
October 2005. Declines in refinery capacity utilization and increases in the share of oil 
imported accounted for the rest of the difference. Other factors accounted for little of the 
upturn in gasoline prices. 
 
• Nebraska gasoline prices were approximately 10 percent lower than expected between 
June 2004 and October 2005 based on statistical modeling. 
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• As a result of production and refinery disruptions, gross refining margin per barrel of oil 
grew from $13.46 per barrel in quarter three of 2004 to $21.30 per barrel in quarter three 
of 2005.  
 
• Despite the increase in margins and profitability for U.S. operators at major petroleum 
firms, the price-earnings ratios of the firms have declined. In other words, the stock price 
of these firms rose much less briskly than did profitability. This indicates that investors 
expect this profitability to be short-lived. While average earnings per share for these 
firms rose from $4.21 in September 2004 to $7.50 in December 2005, the average price-
earnings ratio declined from 12.5 in September 2004 to 8.7 in December 2005.  
 
• In other words, hurricanes in Fall 2005 functioned similarly to OPEC supply restrictions, 
producing higher prices, lower output, and elevated profits. In contrast, Hurricane Ivan in 
2004 had a less significant impact on gasoline prices. Ivan did not substantially disrupt 
refining operations as was the case with Katrina and Rita.  
 
Retail Prices in Nebraska Cities 
• Nearly all of the increase in Nebraska regular unleaded gasoline and diesel retail prices 
was due to an increase in wholesale prices. 
 
• Relative to wholesale prices, retail prices for unleaded gasoline rose faster nationally than 
in Nebraska cities during September and October of 2005.  
 
• As wholesale and retail prices began to fall after peaking, retail prices were sticky in a 
downward direction in most smaller Nebraska cities and for the United States overall. 
 
• Our analysis of the data suggests that individual retailers did not base costs simply on 
wholesale prices plus a margin, but instead based prices on what the market would bear. 
 
• Further, there was no substantial indication of a pattern in the individual brands leading 
prices upward or downward in individual Nebraska cities. 
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PART ONE: LAWS AFFECTING MOTOR FUEL PRICING 
I. The Legal Environment for Price Determination  
 
Motor fuel prices are generally unregulated. However, various state and federal laws 
affect the environment in which price-setting occurs. These laws perform important functions 
which facilitate and support the interaction of supply and demand forces in a competitive 
marketplace.  
A market-based economic system is deeply rooted in our country’s legal and economic 
history. More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith identified the essential roles of self-interest 
and the quest for profit in the satisfaction of human needs:  
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which 
I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it 
is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good 
offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.1
 
The freedom to make private economic decisions is thus part of the foundation of our market 
economy.2  
Public confidence in the integrity of markets is important, and both federal and state 
governments have important functions in this regard.3 From time to time, supply and demand 
functions may be temporarily disrupted or destabilized. In these circumstances, government has 
                                                 
1 Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book 1, Chapter 2 (1776), 
reprinted in 36 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 8 (2d ed. 1990).  
2 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1996) (“So long as we preserve a predominantly 
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private 
economic decisions.”) (quotation omitted). 
3 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992) (“The preservation of the free market and of a 
system of free enterprise without price fixing or cartels is essential to economic freedom. [Citation omitted.] A 
national policy of such a pervasive and fundamental character is an essential part of the economic and legal system 
within which the separate States administer their own laws for the protection and advancement of their people. 
Continued enforcement of the national antitrust policy grants the States more freedom, not less, in deciding whether 
to subject discrete parts of the economy to additional regulations and controls.”)  
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intervened to restore normal competitive market functions. For example, antitrust laws are 
designed to address harmful effects of unlawful collusion or restraints of trade that can 
undermine the beneficial effects of competition in the marketplace. As the Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is 
the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity 
whatever economic muscle it can muster.4
 
State and federal laws also address unfair trade practices, and these laws reflect efforts to 
police the marketplace of conduct that is inimical to consumer interests. The Federal Trade 
Commission is charged with enforcing federal laws addressing both consumer protection and 
competition.5 At the state level, this enforcement authority is typically invested in the Attorney 
General. Government enforcement efforts may also be supplemented by private actors, who are 
incentivized by provisions allowing the recovery of treble damages or attorney’s fees. 
The matter of so-called “price gouging” presents special concerns in defining the 
appropriate scope of government intervention in the price-setting function. On one hand, price 
changes help to allocate scarce resources among those who desire them. Disrupting this function 
through restrictions or controls on prices can adversely affect the flow of goods and services to 
those who want them. Price controls may benefit some individuals who purchase at lower prices, 
but they also potentially impact the broader public welfare in a negative way. In particular, 
customers willing to pay more to acquire a good or service may be unable to do so because the 
                                                 
4 United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
5 See, e.g., The FTC in 2005: Standing Up for Consumers and Competition (FTC April 2005), available online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/0504abareportfinal.pdf . 
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supply of the good is constrained at those price levels. In effect, an allocation problem solved by 
price is resolved by other means, such as queuing.  
On the other hand, disruptions associated with emergencies such as natural disasters can 
implicate other policy considerations besides allocation efficiencies. Shopping costs in such 
environments can be high. Ordinary consumer options to seek out other suppliers, to defer a 
purchase, or to choose substitutes, may be impractical or even impossible in emergency 
situations. As a result, consumers may be willing to pay higher prices for essential goods, but 
that willingness is born of necessity. In an emergency context, firms may thus be able utilize 
these conditions of necessity to appropriate consumer surplus (i.e., the net benefit to consumers 
who previously paid less than the price otherwise justified by their personal demands) by raising 
prices and reaping above-normal profits on existing stocks of goods. 6 Considerations of fair 
play, coupled with strong political incentives to address community interests, may gravitate 
toward intervention on behalf of consumers in these circumstances. However, doing so involves 
a political decision to place consumer interests ahead of seller interests in freely setting prices for 
their property.  
Other policy considerations, including public safety, may also counsel some form of 
intervention, particularly in times of emergencies such as natural disasters. Emergency situations 
typically endure for limited times, after which normal supply functions are soon restored. One 
might question whether the supply constraints would indeed materialize over a short time frame 
on account of price constraints alone. Concerns about public peace, orderly and efficient 
evacuations from endangered areas, and the prompt restoration of order and safety may be served 
                                                 
6 See Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUSTON L. REV. 1819, 1834 (1994) (“In customer 
markets, shopping itself is a cost and that cost may prevent the buyer from securing the best deal for a particular 
item. The lack of complete information due to shopping costs leads to monopoly profits for sellers and multiple 
prices for the same items … Moreover, prices may stabilize at less than optimal levels.”) 
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by the operation of price constraints in the short run, while leaving the longer-term competitive 
climate free from such constraints, though within the purview of antitrust laws. 
Whether government intervention is desirable in this context is thus debatable, and that 
debate is fraught with competing value claims. Nevertheless, the laws of several states provide a 
clear legal basis for intervention in matters of pricing during emergency contexts. In the laws of 
other states, including Nebraska, the legal basis for intervention is much less clear. Congress is 
currently considering proposed legislation to address “price gouging”, but as of the time this 
report is being prepared, none of this legislation has been enacted.7  
As will be discussed in some detail below, Nebraska law leaves considerable doubt as to 
whether any remedial action would be justifiable in the face of recent motor fuel price increases. 
Although Nebraska consumers have experienced significant price changes, these price changes 
appear to be a consequence of broader market forces affecting the supply chain. Variations in 
retail prices reflect a combination of changes in gross margins and cost structures, but much of 
that variation depends on changes in the wholesale or “rack” prices charged to those retailers. 
We have found evidence that gross margins by retailers have grown slightly during the 
market disruption following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Profits by major oil companies grew 
substantially during this period. However, we find no evidence of a systematic attempt by 
retailers to capture consumer surplus by substantially increasing the prices they charge above the 
wholesale costs of refined motor fuels. These price conditions do not provide a basis for 
                                                 
7 A search of proposed legislation for the terms “price gouging” at www.thomas.loc.gov (the Library of Congress 
website) produced 33 legislative bills with these terms. The first six of these bills are as follows:  
1. Treat Emergency Victims Fairly Act of 2005 (Introduced in Senate)[S.1854.IS]  
2. Protection From Price Gouging Against Disaster Victims Act of 2005 (Introduced in Senate)[S.1640.IS]  
3. Price Gouging Act of 2005 (Introduced in Senate)[S.1744.IS]  
4. Protection Against Gouging Activities Act (Introduced in House)[H.R.3705.IH]  
5. Prohibiting Reprehensible Increases in Costs of Essentials (PRICE) Act of 2005 (Introduced in 
House)[H.R.3808.IH]  
6. Gasoline Price-Gouging Act of 2005 (Introduced in House)[H.R.3782.IH]. 
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intervention under any established legal theories involving unconscionability. In particular, 
policies rooted in deterring unconscionable behavior may be harder to justify in this context, 
where citizens are not directly impacted by a natural disaster or similar emergency.  
II. Overview of Federal Laws Affecting Price Competition in Petroleum Products 
 
 The Federal Trade Commission has been active in addressing competitive conditions in 
the petroleum industry. Associate General Counsel for Energy, John H. Seesel, recently appeared 
before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce for the purpose of explaining the FTC’s 
recent initiatives in this area.8 Within the past year, the FTC has engaged in significant studies 
involving gasoline price changes9 and mergers in the petroleum industry.10 These studies 
illustrate the extent of federal government resources directed toward monitoring competitive 
conditions in this industry, not only in the general context of its competitive structure, but also in 
the matter of prices charged at the consumer level.  
Economists from the FTC monitor gasoline price movements in 360 cities in the United 
States, investigating any “unusual” price movements to see whether they result from a “natural” 
cause or from anticompetitive behavior.11 For this purpose, “unusual” price movements refer to 
those “significantly out of line with the historical relationship with the price of gasoline in that 
area and the gasoline prices prevailing in other areas.”12 The United States Department of 
Energy also maintains a “gas price hotline”, which invites consumers to report incidents of 
“price gouging” or “price fixing” which are then collated and passed along to the appropriate 
                                                 
8 See John H. Seesel, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Market Forces, Competitive Dynamics, 
and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect Competitive Markets (September 7, 2005), available online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/109hearings.htm.  
9 See Federal Trade Commission, Gasoline Price Changes: The Dynamic of Supply, Demand, and Competition 
(2005), available online at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/gasprices05/050705gaspricesrpt.pdf. 
10 See Federal Trade Commission, The Petroleum Industry: Mergers, Structural Change, and Antitrust Enforcement 
(August 2004), available online at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt.htm. 
11 See id. at 3-4. 
12 Id. at 3, n. 6. 
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federal authorities or states’ attorneys general.13 Recent legislation directs the FTC to engage in 
further study of these issues.14  
In the event that the FTC finds that an “unusual” price movement is not explained by a 
“natural” cause, the basis for their action is found in various provisions of Title 15 of the United 
States Code. First, the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the FTC to address “unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”15 Unfair methods of competition include behavior in violation of federal 
antitrust legislation, including applicable provisions of the Sherman Act,16 the Clayton Act,17 
and the Robinson-Patman Act.18  
Despite the expansive scope of its prescribed power to address “unfair … acts … 
affecting commerce”, the FTC has not formally exercised that power in circumstances when only 
a disparity in the price typically charged for a good or service formed the basis for dispute. 
Legislation has been introduced to permit such power, but this legislation has not been enacted.19 
Such legislation contains provisions similar to those found in states with “price gouging” 
statutes, which as discussed below focus specifically on the problems of price increases in the 
context of emergency conditions.20 Moreover, this legislation, if enacted, would not preempt 
otherwise applicable state laws. 
                                                 
13 See http://gaswatch.energy.gov/. 
14 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1809, 119 Stat. 594, 1125-26 (2005).  
15 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1).  
16 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7. 
17 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C.A. § 52-53. 
18 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13. The United States Department of Justice shares antitrust enforcement authority with the 
FTC through its Antitrust Division. See generally http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/. It should also be noted that Nebraska 
law also contains antitrust legislation, which is similar to its federal counterparts. Nebraska courts are bound to 
follow federal law interpretations in this context. See generally Arthur v. Microsoft Corporation, 267 Neb. 586 
(2004). 
19 See, e.g., Protection from Price Gouging Against Disaster Victims Act of 2005, S. 1640, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 
September 8, 2005. 
20 See Part IV, infra. 
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In recent testimony before a senate committee, Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman 
Deborah Platt Majoras expressed the agency’s concern regarding federal legislation involving 
price gouging.21 She explained that the FTC has launched an investigation (under §1809 of the 
recently enacted Energy Policy Act) of gas price increases after Hurricane Katrina. However, she 
strongly advised against passing any federal legislation that would deal directly with price 
gouging. Reasons offered in support of this position are summarized as follows:  
• In a free-market economy where the prices of goods are determined by the relationship 
between supply and demand, a federal anti-price gouging statute may actually hurt 
consumers instead of help them. Producers should be free to determine their own prices, 
and the consumers retain the option of reducing purchases if the prices are too high. The 
government should not interfere with this process unless there is clear evidence of 
unlawful conduct. 
• A federal anti-price gouging law would be difficult to enforce fairly, partly because 
“price gouging” itself is hard to define. State statutes on this point contain vague 
descriptions of what constitutes price gouging, leaving the courts with little guidance. 
Any federal legislation would most likely have the same effect.  
• Higher retail prices are usually caused by factors such as worldwide supply, demand, and 
competition for crude oil, rather than by excess oil company profits. The Chairwoman 
pointed out that gasoline prices have been relatively low and stable during the period 
between 1984 and 2004. Therefore, any further federal legislation in this area may not 
only be difficult to implement, but it may also be unjustified. 
                                                 
21 FTC Provides Joint Senate Committee Testimony on Gasoline Prices and Competition in the U.S. Petroleum 
Industry, Nov. 9, 2005, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/11/gastest.htm.
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• At least 28 states already have some sort of anti-price gouging legislation in place, and 
any regulatory action in this field should be left to them. As far as the FTC’s efforts are 
concerned, enforcing existing antitrust laws is the best way to protect consumers. 
State laws that can be used to addressing concerns about high prices arise from both the common 
law of contract, as well as statutory provisions that draw upon the concept of unconscionable 
behavior. These laws are discussed below in the next two sections. 
III. The Constraint of Unconscionability  
 
 Contract law addresses the legal conditions for enforceability of private agreements. 
Although the free and voluntary determination of contract terms is an important value,22 
significant legal constraints may also apply to inappropriate behavior. As the Supreme Court has 
recognized: 
[F]reedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute 
freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not 
withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of 
the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive 
safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from 
reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.23
 
The fact that most modern consumer contracts involve standardized agreements, rather 
than specifically bargained terms, adds further complexity to the freedom of contract ideal. 
These form contracts facilitate efficient distribution of goods and services by avoiding the give 
and take of negotiation.24 Instead, consumer choices are effectuated through movement among 
suppliers in an effort to find a desired product at an acceptable price. The fact that these 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“Voluntary agreements are the 
foundation of our society’s freedom and prosperity.”)  
23 Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911). 
24 See, e.g., Estrin Const. Co. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. 612 S.W.2d 413, 422-23 (Mo.App. 1981) (“The legitimacy 
of an adhesion contract derives, not from the social value of a transaction freely negotiated, but from the social value 
of goods produced more abundantly and cheaper from the reduced cost of legal and other distribution services.”) 
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agreements are contracts of adhesion may provide additional reasons for constraining terms 
imposed by sellers that may affect the public good.25  
One of the constraining principles in the common law of contract was the concept of 
unconscionability, which provides an equitable basis for a court to refuse to enforce an 
agreement.26 This concept has found its way into modern commercial and consumer protection 
statutes. For example, it inspired section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),27 
which allows courts to police the terms of commercial bargains for unfair practices.28 
Commentary to the UCC explains in part: 
In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by 
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by determinations that the clause is 
contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is 
intended to allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or 
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.29
 
The UCC does not define unconscionability, though comments provide this guidance:  
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the 
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as 
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract.30
 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank, 693 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2005) (noting that courts give special scrutiny to 
contracts of adhesion). 
26 See generally Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 88, 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz., 1995) 
(discussing history of unconscionability as equitable remedy). 
27 See Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-302, which provides: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce 
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable 
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
28 See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (1982).  
29 Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1. 
30 Id. 
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The parameters of this test are left to development in case law, though comments draw upon 
prior cases as examples.31
Other consumer protection statutes, such as the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,32 
also invoke unconscionability as a basis for imposing legal sanctions upon sellers who engage in 
unfair trade practices.33 In this context, a statutory definition is also lacking. Thus, courts must 
fashion relief on an ad hoc basis from developing case law.  
Unconscionability provides an uncertain basis for relief because of its amorphous 
character.34 As one prominent commentator has noted, “That the term is incapable of precise 
definition is a source of both strength and weakness.”35 On the side of strength, an uncertain and 
malleable term may allow a court to intervene in circumstances where equity would prefer a 
means for intervention. Some commentators have suggested that unconscionability may be used 
to address cases in which other contractual defenses, such as fraud or duress, were not effectively 
plead or proven, but where the interests of justice indicate a need for relief.36  
On the side of weakness, intervention based on unconscionability may upset settled 
expectations, thus creating ancillary and unintended consequences in the larger economic 
environment that may, in fact, be inimical to public welfare.37 It may also result in wrong results 
in particular cases, as one court has noted:  
                                                 
31 See id. 
32 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-301 to -306. 
33 See id. § 87-301.01. 
34 See Maxwell, supra, which states in part:  
Although U.C.C. § 2-302 recognized and codified the amorphous equitable doctrine, it did little to provide 
a set of rules for analyzing claims of unconscionability. Also lacking in the statutory recognition of 
unconscionability is a definition of that term. Courts and respected commentators alike have grappled with 
defining and applying unconscionability under the Code since its adoption. To this day, both groups remain 
divided on the proper method for doing so, though they share some common ground on defining such a 
test. 
184 Ariz. at 88, 907 P.2d at 57. 
35 Farnsworth, supra, at § 4.28, p. 310. 
36 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. ECON. 293, 303-05 (1975). 
37 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 129 (5th ed. 1998). 
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The doctrine’s flexibility, however necessary to its use as a judicial “safety valve” to 
prevent gross injustice, creates the risk courts may intervene to deprive one contracting 
party of his or her bargain simply because the contractual obligations of the dissatisfied 
party proved more burdensome than originally anticipated.38
 
Disputes invoking unconscionability based on the contract price have been particularly 
difficult for courts to analyze on a principled basis. Generally courts have been hesitant to find 
unconscionability based solely on the disparity between price and cost or market value.39 In one 
of the leading cases in this area, Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, the California Supreme Court 
summarizes the law as follows:  
To begin with, it is clear that the price term, like any other term in a contract, may be 
unconscionable. Allegations that the price exceeds cost or fair value, standing alone, do 
not state a cause of action. Instead, plaintiff’s case will turn upon further allegations and 
proof setting forth the circumstances of the transaction. The courts look to the basis and 
justification for the price, including “the price actually being paid by ... other similarly 
situated consumers in a similar transaction.”40
 
This court thus suggests that there are no clear rules about prices and unconscionability. 
According to the court, prices that exceed cost or even fair market value may not necessarily be 
unconscionable. Elsewhere, the court also stated that a high profit margin does not, of itself, 
result in unconscionability, although it may indicate a need for judicial scrutiny.41  
 Facts and circumstances are thus important – but deciding which ones arise to the level of 
unconscionable behavior promotes uncertainty. The California Supreme Court was careful to 
preserve this facts-and-circumstances approach from encroachment, going so far as to reject a 
categorical statement that a competitive market price could not be unconscionable:  
The cases, however, do not support defendant’s contention that a price equal to the 
market price cannot be held unconscionable. While it is unlikely that a court would find a 
                                                 
38 Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 128 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1316, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 804 (Cal. App. 4 
Dist.,2005). 
39 See Farnsworth, supra, at § 4.28, p. 311.  
40 Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, 38 Cal.3d 913, 926, 702 P.2d 503, 512, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345, 354 (Cal., 1985) 
(citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
41 See id. 
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price set by a freely competitive market to be unconscionable (see Bradford v. Plains 
Cotton Cooperative Assn. (10th Cir.1976) 539 F.2d 1249, 1255 [cotton futures]), the 
market price set by an oligopoly should not be immune from scrutiny. Thus courts 
consider not only the market price, but also the cost of the goods or services to the seller, 
the inconvenience imposed on the seller, and the true value of the product or service.42
 
This court’s willingness to consider unconscionability for a market price is puzzling, to the 
extent that one would be at a loss to determine an appropriate alternative price. 43 No case holds 
that a competitive market price is unconscionable. However, this language might also be 
appropriately understood by reference to the possibility that other aspects of the agreement 
besides the price may merit relief from enforcement.  
The possibility that unconscionability may arise from other conditions associated with the 
formation of the contract is countenanced by recognition of procedural aspects of 
unconscionability. On this point, the California Supreme Court further explained:  
In addition to the price justification, decisions examine what Justice Weiner in A & M 
Produce called the “procedural aspects” of unconscionability. Cases may turn on the 
absence of meaningful choice, the lack of sophistication of the buyer (compare 
Geldermann & Co., Inc. v. Lane Processing, Inc. (8th Cir.1975) 527 F.2d 571, 576 [relief 
denied to sophisticated investor]) with Frostifresh Corporation v. Reynoso, supra, 274 
N.Y.S.2d 757 [relief granted to unsophisticated buyers]), and the presence of deceptive 
practices by the seller.44
 
Other courts have suggested that the procedural aspects may be more appropriately considered in 
claims of duress, undue influence, fraud, or similar defenses, rather than through 
unconscionability.45 Courts also differ as to whether procedural unconscionability may form a 
basis for relief without also requiring a showing of some substantive unconscionability.46 For 
example, the fact that a contract of adhesion contains terms that are not subject to negotiation 
                                                 
42 Id. (citations omitted). 
43 See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN L. REV. 317, 342 (2002) (“In [the world 
of perfect competition] it is impossible for unconscionable transactions to occur.”) 
44 Id., 702 P.3d at 513, 216 Cal.Rptr. 355 (citations omitted). 
45 See, e.g., Maxwell, supra, 184 Ariz. at 89, 907 P.2d at 59. 
46 See Strand, supra, 693 N.W. 2d at 922-93. 
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suggests that the buyer was at a disadvantage, but to suggest that this alone makes the agreement 
unconscionable would go beyond the scope of accepted legal theory.47
However, procedural problems such as an unequal bargaining power may be evidence of 
substantive unconscionability arising from a “grossly excessive” price.48 As one prominent 
treatise states: 
[A]n unreasonably high or exorbitant price at the very least is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether a particular provision is harsh and whether one party has in fact 
been imposed upon by another party in an inequitable or unconscionable manner. This 
observation represents a middle ground between the position that requires that a 
substantively abusive or harsh term be the result of a procedural abuse and the view that a 
gross price disparity is itself sufficient to warrant relief, even in the absence of other 
inequitable factors.49
 
IV. States with “Price Gouging” Statutes. 
In an attempt to provide a more certain basis to address price behavior during emergency 
situations, some states have enacted specific statutes in order to deter “price gouging.” These 
“price gouging” statutes share many similarities. Most of them apply specifically to sellers in 
conditions involving an emergency as declared by the state or local government. They invoke 
either considerations of unconscionability or public welfare as an operative principle. They 
function primarily as price control statutes, limiting current prices based on those occurring 
before the state of emergency. Nearly all include provisions allowing sellers to recoup additional 
costs incurred during the emergency, but the nature and extent of those costs is a disputed matter. 
Some states may also provide safe harbors to protect sellers from being challenged for only 
modest price increases above their costs. 
                                                 
47 See id. 
48 See Maxwell, supra.  
49 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 18:15 (Indicia of Unconscionability – Price). 
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Significantly, these statutes provide the basis for civil and sometimes criminal penalties 
against sellers, as well as an obligation of restitution. (In contrast, unconscionability under the 
common law or the UCC typically involves a defense to enforcement of a provision, rather than 
a source of additional damages.50) Thus, they involve significant economic consequences to 
affected sellers who run awry of their provisions.  
New York, an early adopter of modern “price gouging” legislation, has left its mark on 
legislation in several other states. New York also has a unique advantage of extensive case law 
interpreting its “price gouging” statute, whereas other states have no reported decisions to date. 
Thus, the discussion below leads off with an extensive analysis of New York law and its manner 
of applying the unconscionability concept in this context. In the interests of brevity, this study 
does not cover every extant price gouging statute; only major comparative differences are 
mentioned for illustrative purposes. However, a table summarizing significant features of these 
state laws can be found in Appendix A.  
A. New York.  
 
New York provides one of the earliest examples of modern legislation to address the 
issue of “price gouging” during emergency situations.51 Section 396-r of the New York General 
Business Laws was enacted in 1979 to deal with concerns about rising consumer costs for home 
heating oil.52 Section 396-r states the following legislative finding: 
[D]uring periods of abnormal disruption of the market caused by strikes, power failures, 
severe shortages or other extraordinary adverse circumstances, some parties within the 
chain of distribution have taken unfair advantage of consumers by charging grossly 
excessive prices for essential consumer goods and services.53
                                                 
50 See Arthur v. Microsoft Corporation, 267 Neb. 586 (2004). 
51 Of course, price control legislation has previously existed during national emergencies, including World War II. A 
detailed analysis of the history of this legislation is beyond the scope of this study. 
52 See State v. Strong Oil Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (discussing legislative history).  
53 See New York General Business Law § 396-r(1) (McKinney 2005). 
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In response to this concern about “unfair advantage”, the legislature effectively imposed price 
controls on sellers during the period following a declaration of a state of emergency by the 
Governor.54 During this period, “no party with in the chain of distribution of … consumer goods 
or services or both shall sell or offer to sell any such goods or services or both for an amount 
which represents an unconscionably excessive price.”55 Covered goods included “consumer 
goods and services vital and necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of consumers,” as well 
as any repairs made “on an emergency basis.”56
 This statute empowers the Attorney General to proceed against alleged violators seeking 
injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties of up to ten thousand dollars.57 The statute 
provides that the question whether a price is “unconscionably excessive” is a question of law for 
the court to determine, and that this determination shall be based on these factors: 
(i) that the amount of the excess in price is unconscionably extreme; or (ii) that there was 
an exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means; or (iii) a combination of both 
factors ….58
 
Though these factors share a tautological flavor due to their repeated invocation of 
unconscionability as a measuring point, they also suggest an inquiry into both substantive price 
terms and the context for extracting that price.  
The statute goes on to define the prima facie case (i.e., a case which, unless rebutted by 
the defendant, establishes the government’s claim) could be made by evidence showing a “gross 
disparity” between the “price” and the “value” of the goods. For this purpose, value is measured 
by reference to the price offered “by the defendant in the usual course of business immediately 
                                                 
54 See id. § 396-r(2).  
55 Id.  
56 See id.  
57 See id. § 396-r(4). 
58 Id. § 396-r(3). 
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prior to the onset of the abnormal disruption of the market.”59 Alternatively, a prima facie case 
could be made by showing that “the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the 
same or similar goods or services were readily obtainable by other consumers in the trade 
area.”60 The defendant may also rebut the Attorney General’s case by showing evidence that 
“additional costs not within the control of the defendant were imposed on the defendant for the 
goods or services.”61  
Case law has arisen involving the application of this statute to sales of home heating 
oil,62 electrical generators,63 and roof repair services.64 Perhaps the most significant of these 
cases is People v. Two Wheel Corporation,65 which reached the Court of Appeals in New York, 
that state’s highest appellate court. This case involved a price-gouging claim against a retailer 
selling generators following the devastation of Hurricane Gloria, which left much of Long Island 
without electrical power between September 27 and October 8, 1985.66 The defendant sold about 
100 generators at prices ranging from 4 percent to 67 percent over those charged immediately 
before the hurricane.67 The trial court had ordered defendant to pay a civil penalty of $5,000, as 
well as to make restitution. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals ultimately 
heard this important case. 
The Court of Appeals first determined that the generators sold here were squarely within 
the scope of the statute as intended by the legislature, stating in part:  
                                                 
59 Id. § 396-r(3)(b)(i). 
60 Id. § 396-r(3)(b)(ii). 
61 Id. 
62 See State v. Strong Oil Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1980), reversed on other grounds, State v. Strong Oil Co., 
451 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y.A.D. 1982).  
63 People v. Chazy Hardware, Inc. 675 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1998); People v. Two Wheel Corp, 525 N.E.2d 692 
(NY Ct. App. 1988). 
64 People v. Dame, 734 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 2001).  
65 71 N.Y.2d 693, 525 N.E. 2d 692 (Ct. App. NY 1988). 
66 See id., 71 N.Y.2d at 696. 
67 See id.  
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The situation is ripe for overreaching by the merchant, who enjoys a temporary 
imbalance in bargaining power by virtue of an abnormal level of demand, in terms of 
both the number of consumers who desire the item and the sense of urgency that 
increases that desire.68
 
The court found that some consumers needed the generators to power medical equipment or to 
keep food from spoiling, which undoubtedly lent support to the government’s position. 
Consequently, the merchant’s typical prerogative of ownership was effectively deemed 
subservient to the interests of consumers. The merchant could presumably refuse to sell at all, 
but if he/she did choose to sell, the sale would be subject to the price limitation of the statute. 
 The heart of this case is the discussion of whether the sales prices in this case are 
“unconscionably excessive.” The defendant pointed to the fact that some of the sales in this 
period exceeded the base price by less than five percent, and the majority involved price 
increases of less than thirty percent. It alleged that these sales could not satisfy the “gross 
disparity” standard.69
The court rejected this argument, finding that “the term ‘unconscionably excessive’ does 
not limit the statute’s prohibition to ‘extremely large price increases’, as [the defendant] would 
have it.”70 Instead, the court looked to unconscionability as interpreted in the common law and 
under the Uniform Commercial Code, and in particular to the substantive and procedural 
elements as traditionally applied.  
As the court explained, the substantive element focuses on whether a contract term is 
“unreasonably favorable” to one party, whereas the procedural element looks to the process of 
forming the contract. In particular, the procedural element looks to 
such factors as inequality of bargaining power, the use of deceptive or high-pressure sales 
techniques, and confusing or hidden language in the written agreement …. Thus, a price 
                                                 
68 See id. at 697.  
69 See id. at 698. 
70 See id. at 698-99 (citations omitted). 
 26
Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force 
On Motor Fuel Pricing in Nebraska 
may be unconscionably excessive because, substantively, the amount of the excess is 
unconscionably extreme, or because, procedurally, the excess was obtained through 
unconscionable means, or because of a combination of both factors.71
 
In this context, the Court found that all of the alleged price increases were unconscionably 
obtained, due to the context of the market disruption: “The evidence … makes the inference 
inescapable that all of the price increases were tainted by [the seller’s] use of the superior 
bargaining position attributable to the power outage.”72 Moreover, the seller also failed to prove 
that the cost increases were due to a higher cost structure, which would have otherwise been an 
adequate defense. As a result, the court upheld the sanctions imposed by the lower court, 
including a requirement of restitution.  
 This decision was controversial, as reflected by a vigorous dissent joined by two justices. 
The majority’s approach effectively means that any sales above the base price charged before the 
disruption are subject to sanction on the basis of procedural concerns about sales under 
emergency situations. Under this sweeping approach, unconscionability could thus be found 
based on any effort to raise prices to extract additional profit from consumers that was not 
supported by higher costs.  
 Subsequent cases involving the price gouging statute have involved substantial price 
increases. For example, in People v. Chazy Hardware,73 which also involved the sale of electric 
generators during a power outage, the markups at issue were even higher than those in the Two 
Wheel case. In this case, an ice storm struck Clinton County, New York, causing severe power 
outages. The local hardware store (the seller), which had only one generator in stock (which had 
been in inventory for nearly two years), sought out additional supplies from a wholesaler in 
Vermont. After taking orders from customers covering 42 generators, the seller sent its truck to 
                                                 
71 See id. at 699. 
72 See id. 
73 675 N.Y.S.3d 770 (Sup. Ct. NY 1998).  
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Vermont for the purpose of acquiring 56 generators at a cost of $533 for a smaller unit and $636 
for a larger unit. To these costs the seller added its customary margin of 28 percent, making the 
selling prices $683 and $840, respectively. 
Seller opened its business later that day — on a Sunday — to distribute the generators to 
the customers who had preordered them. The remaining fourteen generators (one large unit and 
thirteen small ones) were then offered for sale to the public at $1,190 for all units, reflecting a 
substantial additional markup. These sales, and not the pre-ordered sales, were the subject of the 
Attorney General’s action under the price gouging statute.  
The court agreed that these prices were unconscionably excessive, even after considering 
the impact of “extraordinary costs” of over $5,065 or $93 per unit. The opinion did not explore 
the nature of these costs, however. The fact that the seller assumed risks associated with 
acquiring this inventory (i.e., driving its truck through icy conditions to another state) as well as 
holding that inventory without preexisting customers orders (recall that the seller’s previous 
inventory of one generator had been in stock for nearly two years) was apparently not considered 
in connection with the calculus of cost.  
The sale of generators was also challenged in People v. Beach Boys Equipment 
Company,74 which also arose from an ice storm in 1998. In this case, the seller charged $1200 
for generators which were sold in the region for less than half this amount. Although the seller 
alleged that it paid its supplier $1000 for the generators, the court found that this was not an 
arm’s length transaction. The supplier cost was shown to be $480, which would suggest that, if 
the seller’s allegation of a $1000 price was true, the supplier may have violated the price-
gouging statute.  
                                                 
74 709 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2000).  
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The seller also alleged that it had extraordinary costs, including “truck rental, payroll, gas 
cans, plugs, cords, and telephone calls.”75 However, the court rejected the possibility that these 
costs could have subsumed the entire margin. Significantly, the court also noted:  
Indeed, even a small increase in price may be unconscionably excessive under General 
Business Law § 396-4 if “the excess was obtained through unconscionable means” … 
which was the case here.76 
 
Thus, the New York Supreme Court in this case (a lower court than the Court of Appeals in Two 
Wheel) suggests continuing validity for unconscionable means resulting from the state of 
emergency to taint even modest price increases that are not justified by cost differentials.  
 The price gouging statute in New York was also used in a case involving home heating 
oil, which is closely analogous to the issue of gasoline pricing. In State v. Strong Oil Company,77 
the Attorney General brought a complaint based on a sale to a customer of home heating oil at a 
price of $1.009 per gallon. Prices surveyed several days prior to this sale ranged from $.879 to 
$.969 with an average of $.923, and prices several days after this sale ranged from $.959 to $.991 
with an average of .973. Thus, the amount of the excess in this case (which is indeed hard to 
determine, as there was no evidence of contemporaneous prices, only prices before and after) 
would appear to be quite modest.  
However, this case was ultimately decided in favor of the seller on other grounds, which 
do not involve the matter of an unconscionably excessive price. The court found that the New 
York statute was preempted by the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.78 
Since this 1973 Act has since expired, it has no continuing preemptive effect with regard to the 
application of the price gouging statute to petroleum products, including motor fuels. 
                                                 
75 Id. at 731. 
76 Id. (quoting Two Wheel Corp., supra.).  
77 433 N.Y.S. 3d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affirmed, 451 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1982). 
78 See State v. Strong Oil Co., 451 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1982).  
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Nevertheless, the fact that this court did not reject small price increases out of hand, and that the 
Two Wheel case implies that even a small increase could be actionable, presents the possibility of 
expanded application of this provision. 
Significantly, no cases involving motor fuel prices have ever been decided in New York. 
Although it might be argued that motor fuel sellers may be subject to price gouging allegations 
based on the context of sales within a state of emergency, as suggested in the Two Wheel case, 
several additional factors need to be considered. First, an emergency declaration is a necessary 
precondition for invoking the statute. The fact that petroleum trades in a global market means 
that events impacting markets in other areas can have local price effects. Sellers move their 
products to seek out the higher priced demand, which translates into higher prices.  
Hurricane Katrina’s impact on global gasoline markets is evident from the fact that, once 
news of the hurricane reached petroleum exporters, vessels in the Atlantic bound for European 
markets turned around to return to the United States with their cargoes of gasoline.79 That 
change in plan was presumably made in response to the prospect of higher prices and profits, 
rather than because of altruistic considerations.  
Thus, even if an emergency declaration was made, the matter of higher supplier costs 
must still be considered. The price gouging statute does not prevent a seller from making a profit. 
As illustrated in Chazy Hardware, the seller was allowed to add its typical markups on the new 
generators it purchased. The initiative to travel in icy conditions to pick up new generators would 
have been eliminated if no profit was allowed. Moreover, gasoline is fungible and not capable of 
specific identification, as in the case of a generator. To the extent replacement stocks of gasoline 
come in at higher prices, those higher costs should arguably be allowed to be recouped under the 
                                                 
79 See International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report 3 (9 September 2005), available online at 
www.oilmarketreport.org. 
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New York statute, as well as under any system of commercial fair play. It should be noted, 
however, that the laws of other states may not permit these higher replacement costs to be taken 
into account in evaluating whether price gouging occurs. Such issues are discussed below. 
B. Other States.  
 
Price gouging statutes in other states show many similarities with the New York statute. 
However, no reported cases have arisen under any of them. Their impact, if any, would be 
limited to the deterrent effect associated with the hypothetical threat of prosecution under these 
provisions, as well as any actual prosecutions which may not have produced a reported case.  
Some state laws have specifically targeted petroleum products. Connecticut enacted a 
statute in 1991 that does not invoke unconscionability, but instead proscribes any sales at a price 
that “exceeds the price at which such energy resource was sold or offered for sale by such person 
in the usual course of business immediately prior to the declaration of the emergency.”80 
However, as in New York, sellers are protected for cost increases: “Nothing herein shall prohibit 
an increase in the price of an energy resource which is attributable to additional costs incurred by 
such person in connection with the acquisition, production, distribution or sale of such energy 
resource.”81  
Georgia’s statute makes it unlawful during a state of emergency “to sell or offer for sale 
at retail any goods or services necessary to preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, or safety 
of persons or their property at a price higher than the price at which such goods were sold or 
offered for sale immediately prior to the declaration of a state of emergency ….”82 As for costs 
                                                 
80 C.G.S.A. § 42-232. 
81 Id.  
82 Ga. Code Ann., § 10-1-393.4(a). This statute was apparently enacted after a series of natural disasters, including 
floods and tornados, affected different parts of the state. See John A. Creasy, Comment, Selling and Other Trade 
Practices, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 31 (1995). 
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incurred by the seller, the statute provides relief: “such price may be increased only in an amount 
which accurately reflects an increase in cost of the goods or services to the person selling the 
goods or services or an increase in the cost of transporting the goods or services into the area.”83
As for the matter of how inventory replacement costs affect pricing, the statute makes a 
special provision for lumber:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section, a retailer or 
installer of lumber, plywood, and other lumber products may increase the price of such 
products as may be necessary to replenish his or her existing daily stock at current market 
rates, maintaining the same markup percentage he or she applied prior to the state of 
emergency.84 
 
By implication, the omission of other products from this statute suggests that higher replacement 
costs should not be considered in pricing one’s current inventory.  
Iowa has adopted a similar rule ignoring increased replacement costs in its regulations on 
unfair price terms, which provide in part: 
An “excessive price” is one that is not justified by the seller’s actual costs of acquiring, 
producing, selling, transporting, and delivering the actual product sold, plus a reasonable 
profit. In calculating the seller’s actual costs, no allowance shall be made for the 
replacement costs of merchandise if the seller is reasonably assured of recouping the 
replacement costs as a part of the price of subsequent sales of the merchandise. 85
Here, the seller would typically not be able to charge a higher price for existing stocks unless the 
seller is “reasonably assured” that the existing stock can be sold at least the same price. In an 
environment of significant price fluctuations, query whether anyone could meet the “reasonable 
assurance” standard. Such a rule would presumably induce sellers to purchase lower than normal 
quantities to be assured that they would, indeed, be able to recoup the replacement cost in 
subsequent sales. Unfortunately, this behavior would also potentially lead to more shortages of 
needed goods. 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 Id. § 10-1-393.4(b). 
85 Iowa Admin. Code. § 61-31.1(714). 
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 Rules like those found in Iowa and Georgia create potentially significant problems for 
motor fuel retailers, who often have significant inventories on hand to meet customer demands. 
In an environment involving disruptions in supplies, higher costs associated with replacement 
stocks are very real costs for retailers who wish to continue in business. Consider a simple 
example with a gasoline retailer having a 10,000 gallon supply purchased at $2. If replacement 
costs are now $3, a retailer required to continue selling existing stocks based on its historical 
markup from $2 would not generate enough capital to replace those stocks with new gasoline. In 
an economic sense, the seller is worse off than before, as the price constraint effectively 
prevented the seller from continuing the same level of business.86
 Moreover, in situations with volatile prices, these retailers face the double-edged sword 
of potentially falling prices and their impact on profits. To the extent that competing firms drop 
their prices to take into account the lower costs of incoming supplies, a retailer with existing 
stocks acquired at a higher historical cost is left with the difficult choice of (a) keeping prices 
higher than competitors to recoup those costs and losing significant sales to competitors, or 
(b) dropping prices and taking a loss on existing inventories. The profits earned during times of 
price increases thus compensate for the losses incurred when prices are declining. 
Thus, depriving sellers of the ability to replace their inventory by charging current 
replacement costs to customers not only prevents them from maintaining their economic capital, 
but also could ultimately result in lower inventory levels with potential adverse effects on 
consumer wellbeing. 
                                                 
86 See generally Edward A. Morse, Demystifying LIFO: Towards Simplification of Inflation-Adjusted Inventory 
Valuation, 2 FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 559, 567-72 (1995) (discussing physical capital maintenance approaches to 
measuring taxable income). 
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Indiana’s “price gouging” statute seems to recognize these concerns, as it makes a 
specific allowance for replacement costs in determining whether an unconscionable price has 
been charged: 
For purposes of this chapter, “price gouging” means charging a consumer an 
unconscionable amount for the sale of fuel. Price gouging occurs if: 
(1) the amount charged grossly exceeds the average price at which fuel was readily 
obtainable within the retailer’s trade area during the seven (7) days immediately 
before the declaration of emergency; and  
(2) the increase in the amount charged is not attributable to cost factors to the retailer, 
including replacement costs, taxes, and transportation costs incurred by the retailer.87
 
Louisiana approaches this issue in a different way, but also arguably allows sellers to take 
into account these costs. It allows the seller to include “reasonable expenses and a charge for any 
attendant business risk, in addition to the cost of goods and services which necessarily are 
incurred in procuring the goods and services during the state of emergency.”88 The provision for 
business risk could take into account many kinds of costs, leaving considerable room for price 
increases.  
 Other states, such as Arkansas and California, provide a safe harbor for price increases on 
motor fuels and certain other goods only if the increase exceeds a stated amount, which 
presumably takes these attendant risks into account. In Arkansas, an unfair pricing practice does 
not arise during a state of emergency unless the seller charges “a price of more than ten percent 
(10%) above the price charged by that person for those goods or services immediately prior to 
the proclamation of emergency.”89 However, the statute further limits unfair prices from arising 
as follows: 
a greater price increase shall not be unlawful if that person can prove that the increase in 
price was directly attributable to additional costs imposed on it by the supplier of the 
goods or directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to provide the 
                                                 
87 Ala. Code § 8-31-3. 
88 Louisiana Stat. Ann. § 29:732(A).  
89 Arkansas Code Ann. § 4-88-303 (a)(1). 
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services, provided that in those situations where the increase in price is attributable to 
additional costs imposed by the seller’s supplier or additional costs of providing the good 
or service during the state of emergency, the price represents no more than ten percent 
(10%) above the total of the cost to the seller plus the markup customarily applied by the 
seller for that good or service in the usual course of business immediately prior to the 
onset of the state of emergency.90
 
California law contains an essentially identical provision.91  
Oklahoma has enacted a “Price Stabilization Act”92, which also provides a safe-harbor 
provision allowing a ten-percent price change, but it contains no express reference to higher 
costs as a defense.93 West Virginia and the District of Columbia also utilize a ten-percent 
limitation in their statutory schemes. 
Although the ten percent limitation gives some breathing room to sellers who raise prices, 
the definitions adopted in Arkansas and California leave some uncertainty about who might be 
affected based on increased replacement costs. Higher prices up the supply chain can only 
provide a justification for a retailer to charge higher prices if the costs incurred from its suppliers 
were, in turn, either no more than ten percent higher (taking into account the customary markup) 
or they were justified by higher costs. This means that a seller could technically be subjected to 
penalties even though the seller was only passing along costs it incurred, if another member in 
the supply chain had violated the rule. This kind of rule might explicitly address the problem 
presented in the New York case of Beach Boys Equipment Company, discussed above, where a 
question about arm’s-length pricing was raised. However, this arguably creates other problems in 
enforcement which are not in accord with a standard of unconscionable behavior.  
Florida’s statute addressing price gouging takes a slightly different tack in dealing with 
replacement costs. It uses an ambiguous “gross disparity” standard for evaluating whether a price 
                                                 
90 Id. § 4-88-303(a)(2). 
91 See California Penal Code § 396(b). 
92 See 15 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 777.1-.5. 
93 See id. § 777.4.  
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charged is unconscionable, using as the basis for comparison the average prices charged during 
the 30 days preceding the emergency.94 However, it also provides for a defense to the extent that 
any increase in the amount charged is “attributable to additional costs incurred in connection 
with the … sale of the commodity … or national or international market trends.”95
This reference to “national or international market trends” recognizes that forces outside 
the current trade area may affect the price at which commodities are available. In effect, this 
recognizes that markets for many important consumer goods, including petroleum products, are 
impacted by events in other geographic or product markets. This would apparently take into 
account the realities of replacement costs to retailer pricing, which as discussed above was 
problematic in Iowa and Arkansas. However, it would also allow potentially significant price 
increases to consumers within the scope of the statute.  
V. Legal Standards for Unconscionable “Price Gouging” in Nebraska 
 
Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act96 contains a general provision that 
could potentially be applied to “price gouging” behavior: “An unconscionable act or practice by 
a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction shall be a violation of sections 87-301 to 
87-306.”97 The statute also provides the following guidance as to the nature of 
unconscionability: 
The unconscionability of an act or practice shall be a question of law for the court. If it is 
claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties 
shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and 
effect to aid the court in making its determination.98
 
                                                 
94 Florida Stat. Ann. § 501.160. 
95 Id. 
96 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-301 to -306. 
97 Id. § 87-303.01(1).  
98 Id. § 87-303.01(2). 
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This “setting, purpose, and effect” provision is similar to that found in Nebraska’s version of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.99 Other Nebraska statutes also invoke unconscionability as a basis 
for legal relief from the enforcement of agreements, without providing a specific definition.100  
The challenge in this context is to ascertain how a court might interpret unconscionability 
in the context of motor fuel price increases as recently experienced after Hurricane Katrina. 
Nebraska law embraces the traditional doctrine of consideration in contract law, as recently 
reaffirmed by the Nebraska Court of Appeals:  
Generally, a court will not inquire into the adequacy or value of the stated consideration 
so long as the performance or the promise of performance is one that the promisor 
considers of value. The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that even a ‘peppercorn’ or 
other nominal consideration may be sufficient consideration as long as the promisor 
deems it of value. Pruss v. Pruss, 245 Neb. 521, 534, 514 N.W.2d 335, 345 (1994). “The 
monetary value of the performance or the promise of performance is irrelevant. It is 
sufficient that the promisee did something he or she was not otherwise required to do or 
that the promisor received something he or she was not otherwise entitled to receive.” Id. 
See, also, Omaha Nat. Bank v. Goddard Realty, Inc., 210 Neb. 604, 316 N.W.2d 306 
(1982). “Generally, a court will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration for a 
contract, inasmuch as consideration based on value of property or performance of a 
promise is a matter of personal judgment by parties to a contract.” Buckingham v. Wray, 
219 Neb. 807, 809, 366 N.W.2d 753, 756 (1985).101
 
This court also noted the importance of liberty of contract, stating: “‘[i]t is not the province of 
courts to emasculate the liberty of contract by enabling parties to escape their contractual 
                                                 
99 See Neb. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-302 (“When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof 
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.”) 
100 See, e.g., Neb. Stat. U.C.C. § 2-719 (unconscionability as to limitation of consequential damages); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 25-414 (forum selection allowed unless agreement obtained by :misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of 
economic power, or other unconscionable means”); id. § 25-2913 (mediator allowed to terminate process if 
agreement would be unconscionable); id. § 42-366 (granting judicial authority to disallow marital property 
settlement deemed unconscionable). See also Neb. Const. Art. XV, § 9 (granting authority to make laws for “the 
prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any business or vocation affecting the public 
welfare.”  
101 James Neff Kramper Family Farm Partnership v. Dakota Indus. Development, Inc. 8 Neb.App. 893, 893, 603 
N.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Neb.App. 1999). 
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obligations on the pretext of public policy unless the preservation of the public welfare 
imperatively so demands.’”102
 An older case involving the matter of specific performance of a land sale contract 
likewise states this hesitation to intervene, except in extreme cases suggesting fraud or some 
other basis for intervention: 
Inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient to prevent a decree, unless the disparity is so 
great as to shock the conscience of all reasonable men and thus afford an irresistible 
inference of fraud. Such a case was Byers v. Surget, 19 How. (U. S.) 303, 15 L. Ed. 670, 
where defendant attempted to sustain a public sale for $9.75 of land worth from $40,000 
to $70,000. That was an extreme case, but serves to illustrate the general rule, which 
arose partly from the difficulty of determining by any definite standard what amount of 
inadequacy must exist to constitute the exception. 
The general rule is announced in the cases cited by plaintiff, inter alia, Heyward v. 
Bradley, 179 Fed. 325, 102 C. C. A. 509; Boyce v. Holloway, 45 Ind. App. 535, 91 N. E. 
34; Sweeney v. Brow, 35 R. I. 227, 86 Atl. 115, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1075. In all of these 
cases, however, and in all coming to our attention, it is recognized that the rule is 
applicable only in the absence of fraud, oppression or mistake. Where inadequacy of 
price is shown, though insufficient in itself, if accompanied by circumstances fairly 
establishing fraud or mistake, a case is presented for the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion by the court.103
 
These cases suggest judicial restraint as to interference with price terms under Nebraska 
law. The standard suggested for an inadequate price – “so great as to shock the conscience of all 
reasonable [persons]” – erects a serious barrier to finding unconscionability. Though one might 
point to the fact that consumers have great needs for fuel, and that they do not have the 
opportunity to negotiate those prices specifically as evidence of procedural elements of 
unconscionability, such a position would prove too much. As noted above, such a position would 
call into question the prices charged by retailers for virtually every consumer good.104  
                                                 
102 Id. ,8 Neb. App. at 898, 603 N.W. 2d at 468 (quoting Occidental Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Venco Partnership, 206 
Neb. 469, 480, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980)). 
103 Moore v. McKillip, 194 N.W. 465, 467-68 (Neb. 1923). 
104 See Strang, supra. 
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 Though the Legislature may decide whether to enact a more specific basis for intervening 
in matters of “price gouging” in the context of an emergency or otherwise,105 it is far from clear 
whether the current statute grants that authority. No Nebraska cases have ever interpreted the 
unconscionability constraint in the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act to cover a seller’s act 
of raising prices for a standard commodity, such as motor fuels. This is not a case where the 
price term is hidden in complex and deceptive language of a form agreement; instead the price is 
openly stated to consumers in advance of their purchases.  
An attempt to use the context of price increases after the impact of a natural disaster 
outside the boundaries of Nebraska, such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, raises other 
problems due to the general terms of this statute. First, there is the matter of notice to sellers of 
their potential obligations, which are unclear under this law. Unlike sellers in states with specific 
price-gouging statutes, sellers in Nebraska have comparatively little notice as to the potential 
application of this law to price changes that are openly advertised to consumers. It is unclear 
whether this rises to the level of violating a constitutional right to due process, but even if it did 
not, the practical barriers to developing a consistent basis for enforcement appear to be 
significant.  
Second, the emergency context giving rise to relief in other states invokes considerations 
of the protection of human life and welfare against the impact of a common threat from a natural 
disaster or other similar calamity. In those situations, constraints on prices may be more easily 
justified in relation to those particular goals. Consider, for example, the matter of the sinking 
ship negotiating services of a salvage vessel. The traditional rule in admiralty law would allow 
the price term of a contract negotiated in these circumstances to be challenged subsequently 
                                                 
105 Cf. State v. Kinney, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1940) (“We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or 
appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which ‘should be left where 
* * * it was left by the Constitution—to the states and to Congress.’” (citation omitted)).
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based on the fair value of the salvage services.106 In these circumstances, interests of fair play 
provide a basis for renegotiation due to the duress resulting from circumstances on the sinking 
ship, even though the duress was not caused by the other party to the contract. 
Nebraska consumers have not faced conditions comparable to those in regions directly 
affected by a natural calamity. For example, consumers fleeing an oncoming hurricane under an 
evacuation order may be effectively required to purchase fuel wherever it is available. A decision 
to defer a purchase or shop around for a lower price could generate deadly results, particularly in 
the face of uncertain supplies at other locations. Although Nebraska consumers may consider 
gasoline or diesel fuel to be important to their personal wellbeing, market conditions still permit 
them to shop around for their fuel. Driving on to the next station is still generally an option in the 
event that they encounter a truly egregious price differential based on comparable market 
transactions.  
The absence of price behavior rising to the level of unconscionable “price gouging” is 
further supported by analysis of the basis for price level changes of gasoline and diesel fuels in 
the state. As discussed above, laws of other states dealing with “price gouging” generally treat 
increases in the supplier’s costs as a justifiable basis for raising prices, which is outside the scope 
of unconscionability. As will be discussed below, the information from a survey of Nebraska 
retailers of gasoline and diesel fuel presents a clear case of increasing costs contributing 
significantly to price increases. Though margins did increase slightly during the volatile price 
conditions during this period, they do not reflect an egregious price differential that might 
support a finding of unconscionable behavior.  
                                                 
106 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An 
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83, 100-105 (1978); Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 129-30 (5th ed. 1998) (citing article).  
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PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF MOTOR FUEL MARKETS 
 
Gasoline accounts for roughly 17 percent of the energy consumed in the United States.107 
Autos, light trucks, and trucks consume the lion’s share of this gasoline usage, with boats, 
recreational vehicles, airplanes, and farm vehicles consuming the reminder. Oil companies 
deliver gasoline throughout the nation through pipelines with final connection to the consumer 
via 167,000 gasoline service stations and convenience stores. 
Figure 2.1 shows the composition of the price of gasoline from 2001 to 2005. Oil’s share 
of the price of a gallon of gasoline grew from 38 percent in 2001 to 51 percent in 2005. During 
this same period of time, as a share of price of gasoline, taxes declined from 30 percent to 16 
percent, refining costs and profits dropped from 18 percent to 15 percent, and distribution, 
marketing, and profits rose from 14 percent to 18 percent. (The decline in the share of gasoline 
spending going to taxes can be explained by the fact that gasoline taxes are levied at a fixed 
amount per gallon. Thus, as prices rise, the effective tax rate declines.) 
  
                                                 
107 Source of all petroleum industry data in Part Two is the Energy Information Administration, available online at 
www.eia.doe.gov. 
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Figure 2.1: Components of Gasoline Prices, 2001-2005 (Source: EIA) 
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According to estimates from the EIA, gasoline prices rose $1.03 between 2004 and 2005. 
The EIA found that crude oil producers were responsible for $0.53 of the increase, distributors 
and marketers collected $0.19 of the upturn, federal, state, and local government agencies 
obtained $0.16 of the change, and refiners collected $0.15 of the rise in gasoline prices. 
Figure 2.2 shows how the retail price of a gallon of gasoline was divided in 2005. 
According to the data, for each gallon of gasoline, wholesalers received $1.79 (60 percent), 
government entities collected $0.48 (16.0 percent), transporters obtained $0.06 (2.0 percent), 
credit card companies received $0.09 (3.0 percent), and other vendors collected $0.52 (17.5 
percent). This left $0.04 (1.5 percent) for retailers’ profit. 
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Figure 2.2: Components of the Pump-Price of Gasoline (2005) (Source: EIA) 
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I. What Causes Gasoline Price Fluctuations? 
Prices of basic energy (gasoline, electricity, natural gas, heating oil) are generally more 
volatile than prices of other commodities. One reason is that consumers are limited in their 
ability to substitute between fuels when the price for gasoline, for example, fluctuates. There are 
five fundamental factors that explain variations in the pump-price of gasoline.  
A. Changes in Crude Oil Prices 
According the National Petroleum Council, disruptions in crude oil markets were a major 
factor in all but one of the five rapid increases in gasoline prices between 1972 and 1997. Brisk 
increases in gasoline prices followed events such as the Arab oil embargo in 1973 (prices up 184 
percent), the Iranian Revolution in 1978 (prices up 119 percent), the Iran/Iraq War in 1980 
(prices up 17 percent), and the Persian Gulf War in 1990 (prices up 63 percent). Finally, crude 
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oil prices have risen 111 percent since 2001 due primarily to the rapid expansion in the global 
economy, particularly China. 
Figure 2.3 shows that, in general, there is a strong and positive linkage between oil prices 
and gasoline prices. Since 2001 the relationship changed somewhat, however, with gasoline 
prices increasing 100.2 percent and oil prices growing 122.7 percent.   
 
Figure 2.3: Price of Oil and Gasoline, 1993 to 2005 
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 As a result of the rapid increase in the price of petroleum products since 2001, the share 
of the family budget spent on petroleum products increased dramatically, rising from 
approximately 3 percent in 2002 to almost 4 percent in 2005. Figure 2.4 shows the trend in oil 
prices and the share of the family budget spent on petroleum and oil products. According to BLS 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys, the average U.S. consumer spent $1,333 on gasoline and motor 
oil in 2003. This represented a 26.4 percent increase from 1999 spending. Over this same period 
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of time, the price per barrel of oil grew 59.5 percent and 55.6 percent for OPEC and non-OPEC 
oil, respectively.  
 
Figure 2.4: Trends in the Price of Oil and Percent of Budget Spent on Petroleum and 
Motor Oil, 1996 – 2005108
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B. Seasonality in Consumer Demand 
Even when crude oil prices are stable, retail gasoline prices tend to rise gradually before 
and during the summer and decline in the winter months. If crude oil prices remain unchanged, 
gasoline prices typically would increase 10 to 20 cents per gallon from January to the summer. 
Figure 2.5 shows the average price per gallon by month from 1994 to 2005. Prices are highest in 
January at $1.26 and most expensive in September at $1.45 per gallon. These price differentials 
                                                 
108Percentage of budget spent on petroleum and motor oil for 2004 and 2005 are projected based on oil prices in 
2004 and 2005.  
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result from increases and decreases in gasoline demand with demand growing significantly in the 
summer months due primarily to vacation driving.  
 
Figure 2.5: Average Price per Gallon of Gasoline by Month, 1994 to 2005 
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C. Product Demand and Supply Imbalances 
Rapid changes in demand and supply due to refinery production problems, or lagging 
imports, can produce significant changes in gasoline prices. When stocks are low and falling, 
some wholesalers bid up the price of gasoline to insure adequacy of supply. Such imbalances 
have occurred when a region has changed from one fuel type to another (e.g., to cleaner-burning 
gasoline) as refiners and marketers adjust to the new product. 
Oil imports currently account for an ever-rising share of the nation’s consumption. In 
1973 at the beginning of the first oil crisis, imports represented only 36 percent of overall oil 
consumption in the U.S. American oil production is declining, however, due to the rapidly 
dwindling U.S. oil reserves and the ease of importing foreign supplies. Imports reached more 
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than 10 million barrels a day in April of 2005. They may decline again when the peak summer-
driving season ends, but for the first half of the year they averaged 9.9 million barrels a day, 
according to the American Petroleum Institute, the industry’s trade association. In contrast, 
imports were less than two-thirds as large, about six million barrels a day, in the last two oil 
crises, in 1973-74 and 1979, both of which provoked recessions because crude oil prices soared.  
Figure 2.6 profiles U.S. oil imports per day between 1920 and 2005. Since 1991, imports 
have grown fairly consistently from 5.8 million barrels per day in 1991 to 10.2 million barrels 
per day in 2005.  
 
Figure 2.6: Oil Imports per Day, 1920-2005 (Source: EIA) 
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Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between imports as a percentage of total oil production 
and the price of a gallon of gasoline. In general, a rising import percentage tends to increase the 
price of a gallon of gasoline. Between April 1994 and July 2005, the correlation coefficient 
between the two was 0.680, indicating a very strong and positive relationship between the two 
factors.109  
 
Figure 2.7: Imports as Percentage of Total and Gasoline Prices, April 1994-July 2005 
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D. Environmental Programs 
Various sections of the country require motorists to use special gasoline. Programs in 
these areas are aimed at reducing carbon monoxide, smog, and air toxins. Other environmental 
programs restrict transportation and storage. These reformulated fuels cost more to produce, thus 
increasing the per gallon price of gasoline to the consumer.  
                                                 
109 A correlation coefficient may range between -1 (perfectly and inversely related) and +1 (perfectly and directly 
related).  
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Twenty-five states have passed legislation to restrict the use of the gasoline additive 
MTBE. Only California, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and 
Rhode Island, however, relied on the additive. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, signed into law in 
August 2005, also allows refiners to discontinue use of oxygenates (including MTBE) in 
reformulated gasoline. This change in production will mean large changes in the production and 
distribution of gasoline. For example, in the summer of 2003 California endured temporary 
supply dislocations and price volatility due to the removal of MTBE from gasoline. On the other 
hand, New York and Connecticut experienced few disruptions as they phased out the use of 
MTBE in gasoline in 2004.  
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program began in January 2004. Most refineries 
must comply with the 30 parts per million (ppm) low-sulfur gasoline standards beginning in 
January 2005 and ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel beginning in June 2006. Nearly all refiners must 
produce gasoline if they are to stay in business, but a refiner does not necessarily have to produce 
on-road diesel fuel, which is what the ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel program regulates. Refiners 
can produce only high-sulfur distillate fuel that is used in home heating, electricity generation, 
and other off-road applications. 
Figure 2.8 shows the percentage of gasoline production devoted to reformulated gasoline 
and the price per gallon of gasoline. The relationship appears to be positive. That is, as refineries 
devote more of their capacity to reformulated gasoline, the price per gallon tends to rise. The 
correlation coefficient between the two was 0.135 from 1994 to 2001 and 0.515 from 2001 to 
2005. Thus, the impact of reformulation on gasoline prices has risen significantly since the end 
of the recession in November 2001. 
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Figure 2.8: Percentage of Production Devoted to Reformulated Gasoline110 vs. Price per 
Gallon of Gasoline (in cents), 1995 - 2005 
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110 “Finished gasoline formulated for use in motor vehicles, the composition and properties of which meet the 
requirements of the reformulated gasoline regulations promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
under Section 211(k) of the Clean Air Act. It includes gasoline produced to meet or exceed emissions performance 
and benzene content standards of federal-program reformulated gasoline even though the gasoline may not meet all 
of the composition requirements (e.g., oxygen content) of federal-program reformulated gasoline. Note: This 
category includes Oxygenated Fuels Program Reformulated Gasoline (OPRG). Reformulated gasoline excludes 
Reformulated Blendstock for Oxygenate Blending (RBOB) and Gasoline Treated as Blendstock (GTAB).” (EIA, 
2005). 
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Figure 2.9: Sulfur111 Content vs. Gasoline Prices per Gallon (in cents), 1995-2005 
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E. Weather-related Problems 
Besides seasonality, hurricanes produce abrupt increases in oil and gasoline prices due to 
the closure or cutbacks of oil wells or refineries. With the U.S. relying more heavily on Gulf 
Coast oil production and on refineries in Gulf Coast states, hurricanes have become a more 
significant source of price volatility. Additionally, the ports in the Gulf of Mexico serve as major 
distribution points for petroleum products.  
                                                 
111 “Sulfur is a yellowish nonmetallic element, sometimes known as ‘brimstone.’ It is present at various levels of 
concentration in many fossil fuels whose combustion releases sulfur compounds that are considered harmful to the 
environment. Some of the most commonly used fossil fuels are categorized according to their sulfur content, with 
lower sulfur fuels usually selling at a higher price. Note: No. 2 Distillate fuel is currently reported as having either a 
0.05 percent or lower sulfur level for on-highway vehicle use or a greater than 0.05 percent sulfur level for off-
highway use, home heating oil, and commercial and industrial uses. Residual fuel, regardless of use, is classified as 
having either no more than 1 percent sulfur or greater than 1 percent sulfur. Coal is also classified as being low- 
sulfur at concentrations of 1 percent or less or high-sulfur at concentrations greater than 1 percent.” (EIA, 2005) 
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Three recent hurricanes provide evidence of the contribution of major storms to 
petroleum price volatility. On Thursday September 16, 2004, Ivan struck the U.S. Gulf Coast. 
Hurricane Ivan was the ninth named storm and the only Category 5 hurricane of the 2004 
hurricane season. It became a hurricane on September 5. It caused an estimated $13 billion worth 
of damage in the United States, making it the fourth costliest hurricane to ever strike the U.S. 
Katrina first made landfall as a Category 1 hurricane just north of Miami, Florida on August 25, 
2005. In the Gulf of Mexico it strengthened into a formidable Category 5 hurricane with 
maximum winds of 175 mph. It weakened considerably as it was approaching land, making its 
second landfall on the morning of August 29 on the Gulf Coast near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana 
with 125 mph winds. Hurricane Rita was the fifth major hurricane and second Category 5 
hurricane in 2005 and is on record as being the strongest measured hurricane to ever enter the 
Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane, 
with windspeeds of 120 mph and a storm surge of 10 feet.112  
Table 2.1 illustrates the impact of Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, and Rita on the price of oil 
and gasoline one week before each made landfall to one week after landfall. Over the two week 
period for Hurricane Ivan, the price of a barrel of oil rose from $44.61 to $48.46, or 8.6 percent. 
During this same period of time, the price of gallon of gasoline increased from $1.23 to $1.33 or 
7.8 percent. For the two week period for Hurricane Katrina, the price of a barrel of oil increased 
from $63.27 to $69.47,or 9.8 percent while the price of a gallon gasoline advanced from $1.85 to 
$3.26, or 76.6 percent. Over the two week period for Hurricane Rita, the price of a barrel of oil 
advanced from $63.00 to $65.47, or only 3.9 percent as the price of a gallon of gasoline rose 
from $1.83 to $2.06 or 12.7 percent.  
                                                 
112Information of all hurricanes comes from http://en.wikipedia.org. 
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For Table 2.1, one can conclude that the hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 had approximately 
the same impact on oil prices but the hurricanes of 2005 had a much larger effect on gasoline 
prices than did Hurricane Ivan in 2004.   
  
Table 2.1: Percent Change in Price between One Week Before Hurricane and One Week 
After Hurricane Landfall 
  
Oil 
Prices per 
Barrel 
Percent 
Change 
Gasoline Prices 
per Gallon 
Percent 
Change 
Ivan Sept. 9, 2004 $44.61  $1.23  
 Sept. 23, 2004 $48.46 8.6% $1.33 7.8% 
      
Katrina Aug. 18, 2005 $63.27  $1.85  
 Sept. 1, 2005 $69.47 9.8% $3.26 76.6% 
      
Rita Sept. 16, 2005 $63.00  $1.83  
 Oct. 3, 2005 $65.47 3.9% $2.06 12.7% 
 
Figure 2.10 shows the relationship between the increase in the price of a barrel of oil and 
the number of days since the landfall of Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina. Of course, data for Katrina 
and Rita are intertwined.  
 
Figure 2.10: Impact of Hurricane Ivan and Katrina on Oil Prices 
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Figure 2.11 profiles the change in gasoline prices after the three hurricanes. Clearly 
Hurricane Ivan had only minor impacts on gasoline prices, while the combination of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita had substantial affects on the price of a gallon of gasoline. As presented in 
Figure 2.11, 23 days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the price of a gallon of gasoline rose 
$1.21 per gallon.  
 
Figure 2.11: Impact of Hurricanes on Gasoline Prices (Gulf Coast) 
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 According to industry and government officials, the difference in impacts of the 
hurricanes on gasoline prices but not oil stemmed from the fact that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
had a much more significant impact on refineries. Figure 2.12 displays refining capacity 
utilization one month before the hurricanes, the month of hurricane landfall, one month after 
hurricane landfall, and two months following hurricane landfall. Capacity utilization declined 
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from 97.1 percent one month before Hurricane Ivan landfall to 90.2 percent one month after 
landfall, but rebounded to 94.2 percent two months after landfall. On the other hand, capacity 
utilization was 94.0 percent one month before Hurricane Katrina, declining to 83.9 percent one 
month after landfall, and plummeting to 81.6 percent two months after landfall.  
 
Figure 2.12: Refining Capacity Utilization Before, During, and After Hurricanes 
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 Clearly, refining capacity utilization, among other factors, had a major impact on 
gasoline prices. The next section separates the factors affecting gasoline prices using advanced 
statistical techniques. 
 
II. Modeling the Factors Influencing the Price of Gasoline 
 
In order to disentangle the factors that influence gasoline prices, we next conduct 
regression analysis. Regression analysis is a powerful statistical technique that describes the way 
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in which one important economic variable is related to one or more other economic variables. 
Regression analysis is used to perform one of two tasks:  
1) Predict or forecast a variable based on the values of other variables. 
2) Determine the impact of one factor (the independent variable) on another factor (the 
dependent variable). 
The analysis that follows will focus on determining the impact of the five factors 
identified in the previous section. The regression analysis that follows will use the Limdep 
software package which is widely used by econometricians, statisticians, biometricians, and 
engineers for statistical applications. The primary strength of Limdep is for the estimation of 
many types of regression models. The technique used is termed a random effects model which 
accounts for both the time trend in gasoline prices as well as the varying effects by state.  
Table 2.2 lists the results from the estimation of the gasoline equation.  The first column 
lists the factors potentially affecting gasoline prices. The next two columns respectively show the 
estimated impact on gasoline prices and the likelihood that that impact is zero for years before 
2000. The last two columns show parallel data for the years after 1999.  The random effects 
model was applied to the panel of 50 states from 1994 to 2005.  Results show that the 
fundamental relationship between gasoline prices and its determinants changed dramatically after 
1999, thus the need for separate results.    
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Table 2.2: Factors Affecting the Price of Gasoline, 1993-2005 
 Before 2000 After 1999 
 Impact 
Probability 
Impact is 
Zero Impact 
Probability 
Impact is 
Zero 
Oil price per barrel 2.3265 a 0.0000 2.1282 a 0.0000 
Percent of refinery capacity 
utilization 0.2299 a 0.0000 -0.6942 a 0.0000 
Sulfur content -13.2025 a 0.0001 -10.3507 0.5171 
Percentage of oil imported 21.3439 a 0.0187 294.9205 a 0.0000 
Personal income 0.0145 a 0.0041 0.0175 0.0604 
Personal income growth -4.6793 0.4908 46.4354 a 0.0000 
Percent of gasoline reformulated 38.2109 a 0.0000 123.1814 a 0.0000 
After 1999 -86.5636 a 0.0000 -86.5636 a 0.0000 
Spring season 2.7902 a 0.0000 2.7902 a 0.0000 
Summer season 3.0160 a 0.0000 3.0160 a 0.0000 
Fall season 2.3120 a 0.0000 2.3120 a 0.0000 
Each month -0.0825 a 0.0000 -0.0825 a 0.0000 
Constant -9.0626 0.1683 -9.0626 a 0.1683 
 R2 .942 .942 
 Number of observations 6,800 6,800 
aindicates confidence of 95% 
 
 
 As presented in Table 2.2, each of the factors (except sulfur content after 1999, personal 
income growth before 2000, and personal income growth after 1999) had a statistically 
significant impact on gasoline prices at the 95 percent level of confidence.113 Based on the 
estimates from Table 2.2, we next calculate the contributions of each factor on the increase in the 
price of a gallon of gasoline between June 2004 and October 3, 2005. During this time period, 
the price of a gallon of gasoline rose from $1.72 to $2.06 or 34.6 percent. Table 2.3 lists the 
contribution of each factor to the increase in the price of a gallon of gasoline. 
 
 
                                                 
113A 95 percent level of significance indicates that one is 95 percent confident that the factor has an impact on 
gasoline prices.  
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Table 2.3: Contribution of Factors to Rise in Gasoline Prices between June 2004 and 
October 2005 
  
Contribution 
Percent 
Contribution 
Increase in oil prices $0.22 62.5% 
Decline in refinery capacity utilization $0.07 19.6% 
Reduction in sulfur content $0.01 2.0% 
Increase in percentage of oil imported $0.08 22.9% 
Increase in personal income $0.002 0.6% 
Decline in personal income growth -$0.005 -1.4% 
Increase in percent of gasoline reformulated $0.00 0.09% 
Seasonal/all other factors -$0.04 -6.29% 
Total $0.34 100.0% 
 
As presented in Table 2.3, increases in the price of a barrel of oil accounted for 62.5 
percent of the rise in the price of a gallon of gasoline. Declines in refinery capacity utilization 
and increases in the share of oil imported accounted for 22.9 percent and 19.6 percent of the 
increase the price of a gallon of gasoline. Other factors accounted for little of the upturn in 
gasoline prices between June 2004 and October 2005.  
In addition to calculating the contribution of factors to the gasoline price growth, 
estimates in Table 2.2 are used to calculate the expected price of gasoline versus the actual price 
of gasoline for the 50 U.S. states from 1994 and 2005. As presented in Table 2.4, gasoline prices 
in Pennsylvania were 22.3 percent lower than expected over the time period. On the other side, 
actual gasoline prices were 40.7 percent higher than expected in Alaska. Over the time period, 
Nebraska gasoline prices were 10.5 percent lower than expectations from the statistical model.  
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Table 2.4: Gasoline Prices: Percent Difference between Actual Price and Expected Price, 
1994-2005 (negative sign indicates expected > actual) 
Pennsylvania -22.3% 
Texas -21.7% 
North Carolina -19.6% 
New York -15.9% 
Rhode Island -15.6% 
Connecticut -13.2% 
Tennessee -12.9% 
Ohio -11.2% 
Nebraska -10.5% 
Arkansas -10.4% 
Wisconsin -10.4% 
Maryland -10.3% 
Louisiana -10.3% 
Delaware -7.2% 
West Virginia -6.5% 
Oklahoma -6.3% 
Kansas -6.2% 
California -5.6% 
South Carolina -5.4% 
Virginia -5.3% 
Iowa -4.3% 
Florida -4.2% 
Alabama -4.1% 
Montana -3.8% 
Michigan -3.5% 
Missouri -3.2% 
Utah -2.9% 
Illinois -2.8% 
Massachusetts -1.0% 
Mississippi -0.9% 
Colorado -0.3% 
Indiana 0.3% 
Idaho 0.5% 
Washington 2.5% 
Kentucky 2.8% 
Georgia 4.3% 
Maine 5.0% 
South Dakota 5.1% 
Minnesota 5.2% 
New Hampshire 6.0% 
Oregon 6.6% 
New Mexico 6.8% 
New Jersey 9.0% 
Vermont 9.4% 
North Dakota 9.4% 
Nevada 11.0% 
Arizona 11.6% 
Wyoming 18.0% 
Hawaii 34.2% 
Alaska 40.7% 
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Figure 2.13 shows the price per gallon of gasoline (less taxes) on actual and expected 
basis for the period April 1994 through July 1995.  For much of this period Nebraska’s actual 
prices were below the expected prices based on the model.  Figure 2.14 shows the actual and 
expected gasoline prices (less taxes) for the period June 2004 to July 2005, showing a similar 
pattern.  For this period, Nebraska’s actual prices on average were 5.8 percent less than expected 
based on the model. 
 
Figure 2.13: Nebraska’s Price per Gallon of Gasoline (less taxes)—Expected versus Actual, 
1994-2005 
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Figure 2.14: Nebraska’s Gasoline Price per Gallon (less taxes)—Expected versus Actual, 
2004-05 
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III. Impact of Petroleum Prices on Energy Companies 
 
There is widespread belief that the major oil companies have contributed to recent 
difficulties among the consuming public by manipulating either oil production, refining capacity, 
or inventory levels. While there is scant evidence that they have, there are clear indications that 
they have benefited from recent significant upturns in gasoline and diesel prices. Data presented 
earlier in this chapter indicate that increases in oil prices and reductions were primarily 
responsible for the rapid increases in gasoline price increases between June 2004 and October 
2005, the period of time marked by Hurricanes, Ivan, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. There is 
evidence, however, that the major independent oil companies benefited from the higher oil prices 
and reduced refining capacity.  
According to the EIA, compared to the third quarter for 2004, major independent energy 
companies increased their earnings from worldwide refining and marketing operations 73 
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percent for the third quarter of 2005.114 Higher margins115 offset lower throughput as companies 
were able to expand petroleum prices at a faster pace than oil prices. According to the EIA, 
major oil companies (hereafter majors) achieved higher earnings from their worldwide petroleum 
refining and marketing operations which rose from $5.2 billion for the third quarter of 2004 to 
$9.1 billion for the third quarter of 2005. According to the EIA, this growth occurred primarily 
as a result of U.S. operations. Gross refining margin per barrel of oil grew from $13.46 per barrel 
in quarter three of 2004 to $21.30 per barrel in quarter three of 2005.  
Figure 2.15: Gross Margin per Barrel of Oil for Major Domestic Petroleum Firms, 2003 
Dollars 
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Figure 2.16: Gross Margin as a Percent of Price for Major Domestic Petroleum Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 A list of the major independent energy companies, as designated by EIA, is provided in Table 2.6. 
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115 The per-barrel composite wholesale product price less the composite refiner acquisition cost of crude oil. 
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Table 2.5 summarizes how recent oil and gasoline price growth has affected the major oil 
companies. Revenues grew 29.8 percent from the third quarter of 2004 to the third quarter of 
2005 when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast refineries and oil production 
facilities. Moreover, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reduced domestic refinery throughput relative 
to the third quarter of 2004 which offset the effects of higher U.S. gross refining margins.116 The 
net effect was a 90.0 percent increase in U.S. refining/marketing earnings from $3.7 billion in the 
third quarter of 2004 to $7.0 billion in the third quarter of 2005. The performance of the 11 
companies that reported U.S. refining/marketing earnings was almost uniform. Ten of the 
companies reported higher third quarter earnings in 2005 than in 2004. The company that 
reported lower earnings cited higher energy costs and reduced throughput due to Hurricane Rita.  
 
Table 2.5: Percent Growth Q3, 2005 versus Q3 2004 for Majors 
 Growth 
Overall revenue 29.8% 
Refining and marketing net income 37.7% 
Petroleum net income 36.4% 
Domestic refining and marketing net income 41.4% 
Domestic oil production -4.9% 
Foreign oil production -1.1% 
Gross refining margin per barrel of oil 58.2% 
Source: U.S. EIA 
 
 Despite the increase in margins and profitability for major petroleum firms, the price-
earnings ratios of the firms have declined. In other words, the stock price of major petroleum 
firms rose much less briskly than did profitability. This indicates that investors expect this 
                                                 
116 Gross refining margin is defined as netback crude oil price less spot crude oil price. 
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profitability to be short-lived. Figure 2.17 shows that average earnings per share for these firms 
rose from $4.21 in September 2004 to $7.50 in December 2005. At the same time, the average 
price-earnings ratio declined from 12.5 in September 2004 to 8.7 in December 2005.  
 
Figure 2.17: Earnings per Share and Price/Earnings Ratio for Majors, 2004-05 
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 Table 2.6 lists price-earnings ratios for the major petroleum firms in December 2005. 
This compares to an overall price-earnings ratio for the Standard & Poor’s 500 of 17.2. Clearly, 
despite record profits, investors saw alternative investments as deriving higher rates of return in 
the long run than will the major energy companies. Only Devon Energy and Williams Company 
had a higher price-earnings ratio than the S&P 500.  
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Table 2.6: Price Earnings Ratios of Majors 
Amerada Hess Corporation AHC 10.0 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation APC 6.9 
Apache Corporation APA 7.3 
BP p.l.c. (only U.S. operations included) BP 9.3 
Burlington Resources, Inc. BR 9.6 
Chesapeake Energy Corporation CHK 10.2 
Chevron Corporation CVX 7.4 
ConocoPhillips Inc., COP 5.7 
Devon Energy Corporation D 28.1 
Dominion Resources, Inc. DVN 6.8 
EOG Resources, Inc. EOG 10.2 
Equitable Resources Inc. EQT 17.6 
Exxon Mobil Corporation XOM 10.0 
Kerr-McGee Corporation KMG 10.6 
Yondell Chemical Company LYO 7.1 
Marathon Oil Corporation MRQ 5.9 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation OXY 7.2 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group (only U.S. operations included) RDS-B 9.5 
Sunoco, Inc. SUN 9.1 
Tesoro Petroleum Corporation TSO 7.6 
Valero Energy Corporation VLO 6.6 
Williams Companies, Inc. WMB 19.2 
XTO Energy, Inc. XTO 10.4 
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PART THREE: RETAIL PRICES IN NEBRASKA CITIES 
 
I. Introduction 
In this section we examine gasoline price fluctuations for individual Nebraska cities both 
before and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf Coast region. The goal is to 
examine how retail and rack prices (i.e., public wholesale prices charged at gasoline terminals) 
reacted to market conditions. One issue involves whether retail prices rose and fell as quickly as 
rack prices in each market. In this analysis, we also compare price fluctuations in Nebraska cities 
with national averages. Another issue is the behavior of individual brands and stations. We 
examine whether any particular brands (or stations) commonly led price increases and declines 
in Nebraska cities. 
II. Data Source 
Data for gasoline retailers in 20 Nebraska cities were purchased from the Oil Price 
Information Service (OPIS). OPIS gathers self-reported price data from approximately 85,000 
gasoline stations around the nation, including more than 400 Nebraska stations. Stations do not 
report price data every day, but many stations report price data on most weekdays, and some also 
report on most weekends. We purchased weekly average data from OPIS for regular unleaded 
gasoline and diesel fuel for service stations in 20 Nebraska cities for the period August 2004 
through October 2005. This provides us with weekly data for a full-year before Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita impacted fuel prices, as well as a two month period in the aftermath of the 
storms. We also purchased daily price data for the period from August 16, 2005 to October 31, 
2005 to facilitate a more specific analysis during the period most affected by the storms.  
On average for the 20 Nebraska cities, we received 225 data points per day for regular 
unleaded gasoline. According to license data kept by the Nebraska Department of Revenue, an 
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estimated 650 stations are located in these 20 cities. Thus, on any given day we have data from 
approximately 34 percent of stations.  
In addition to reporting retail prices, OPIS also assigns a wholesale rack price to each 
reporting station each day based on the spot market price charged for the station’s brand at the 
nearest gasoline terminal. OPIS gathers these terminal prices separately. The actual price paid by 
retailers may differ from these spot prices for several reasons: 
• Brand rack prices are based on the prevailing terminal, i.e., the terminal that OPIS 
believes is most frequently used by retailers in that community. Some retailers may use a 
different terminal.  
• Many retailers have a contractual arrangement with their fuel providers that may differ 
from the public spot price charged on any given day. 
Table 3.1 lists the 20 cities included in this analysis. These cities were chosen based on 
the source of consumer complaints received by the Attorney General’s office. The list includes 
the 10 largest cities in Nebraska. We report city-specific results for 19 of the 20 cities as few data 
were available for the city of Holdrege.  
 
Table 3.1 
Nebraska Cities for Which Data Were Obtained 
Alliance Holdrege O’Neill 
Beatrice Kearney Ord 
Broken Bow Lincoln Scottsbluff 
Columbus Norfolk Sidney 
Grand Island North Platte South Sioux City 
Hebron Ogallala Valentine 
Humboldt Omaha  
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III. General Price Trends 
Figure 3.1 illustrates several measures of aggregate price for the Nebraska cities for 
which data were obtained from August 15, 2005 to October 31, 2005. This two and one-half 
month period stretches from just before Hurricane Katrina impacted gasoline prices beginning in 
late August and early September until prices returned to pre-Katrina levels in late October. Daily 
price data illustrate how the market adjusted to price spikes generated by Katrina at the 
beginning of September and then by Hurricane Rita later in September and in early October. 
Figure 3.1 contains data on retail price and the net price received by retailers. Net price is 
calculated by subtracting state and local fuel taxes and estimated freight costs (from the terminal 
to the retailer) from the retail price. Margins are the difference between net prices and rack 
prices.  
   
Figure 3.1
Daily Retail, Net and "Rack" Prices and Margins
Regular Unleaded Gasoline
Aug. 15 to Oct. 31, 2005
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Source: Oil Price Information Service. 
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Results in Figure 3.1 show that retail and net prices closely followed the general trends in 
rack prices. Retail prices rose and peaked in early September just after rack prices rose and 
peaked. Like rack prices, retail and net prices fell steadily through late September before rising 
to a second peak in late September/early October. Retail, net, and rack prices then all fell steadily 
through the end of October. Figure 3.1 illustrates that most of the change in retail gasoline prices 
was caused by fluctuations in wholesale prices.  
Figure 3.1 also illustrates that estimated margins fluctuated during this period. Margins 
are the difference between net prices and rack prices and, therefore, represent the revenue 
available to service stations after paying for gasoline. Significantly, these margins clearly rose 
during much of the period.  
Caution must be used when interpreting these estimated margin data, however. In 
particular, estimated margins for a particular day are not the same as profits. First, a large share 
of the margins must go to cover the costs of operating a service station, costs including capital 
costs such as mortgage payments on pumps, tanks, station buildings and land. There are also 
operating costs such as fees when customers make credit card purchases (these are a percentage 
of the value of the purchase) or costs for service station employees. Second, the reported margin 
data compare the estimated net price of fuel sold retail on a given day with the reported rack 
price of fuel sold at a fuel terminal on that same day. In many cases, retailers actually purchased 
wholesale fuel during a previous day. When rack prices are relatively stable, as is often the case, 
this point is less important. When prices are rising and falling quickly, as in the period we are 
examining, however, margins calculated for a particular day may be less informative. 
Margins calculated for a longer period such as a week or a month provide a better guide 
to the amounts available to a gasoline retailer to cover capital and operating costs of a station and 
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profits to owners. Therefore, the sustained rise in margins evident in Figure 3.1 through much of 
September and early October (and their subsequent decline through October) are notable, and we 
examine these more closely.  
In the first case, we compare the margins during the August 15, 2005 to October 31, 2005 
period with margins during the same period in 2004 (August 15, 2004 to October 30, 2004). 
Average retail prices for the 2005 period were $0.81 higher in aggregate across the 20 Nebraska 
cities. The average rack price rose $0.70 and the average margin rose $0.11. Figure 3.2 also 
shows the change in U.S. average retail prices from August 15, 2005 to October 31, 2005 
compared with the same period in 2004. Nationwide, margins were $0.13 higher in 2005. Like 
Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 illustrates that increasing retail prices in the selected Nebraska cities 
resulted primarily from the effects of the twin hurricanes and other factors that increased rack 
prices. Retail margins, however, also were elevated during the period, though at a lower rate than 
the national average.  
 
Figure 3.2
Change in Retail and Rack Prices and Margins 
for Regular Unleaded Gasoline 
Aug. 15-Oct. 31 Period 2004 Versus 2005 
Aggregate for 20 NE Cities and U.S. Average
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Source: Task Force Analysis of Data from the Oil Price Information Service 
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Figure 3.3, which shows estimated retail margins in aggregate for the 20 cities over the 
entire period from August 1, 2004 to October 30, 2005, confirms the impacts of the hurricanes 
on margins this past fall. This figure shows that margins were higher in September 2005 and 
October 2005 after the hurricanes hit. 
 
 
Figure 3.3
Weekly Retail Margins for 
Regular Unleaded Gasoline 
August 2004 to October 2005
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Source: Oil Price Information Service 
 
Table 3.2 shows more detailed results by examining the increase in margins in 19 of the 
20 cities. (Holdrege is excluded due to insufficient data.) The margin increase is presented for 
the period from August 15, 2005 to October 31, 2005 versus the same period in 2004. Margin 
increases were equal to or within a penny of the $0.11 aggregate increase in many cities: Omaha, 
Beatrice, Broken Bow, Kearney, Norfolk, North Platte, Sidney, and Valentine.  
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Margins rose fastest in Lincoln, Alliance, Humboldt, Ogallala, and South Sioux City. 
Margin increases were smaller in Beatrice, Columbus, Grand Island, Hebron, O’Neill, Ord, and 
Scottsbluff.  
 
Table 3.2 Change in Retail Margins for Regular Unleaded Gasoline From August 15, 2004 
through October 31, 2004 versus August 15, 2005 through October 31, 2005 
Increase in Margins from  
Aug. 15 – Oct 31 
2004 versus 2005 
 
 
Cities 
$0.05 to $0.09  Columbus, Grand Island, Hebron, O’Neill, Ord, 
Scottsbluff 
$0.10 to $0.12 Beatrice, Broken Bow, Kearney, Norfolk, North Platte, 
Omaha, Sidney, Valentine 
$0.13 to $0.18 Alliance, Humboldt, Lincoln, Ogallala, South Sioux 
City 
Source: Task Force Analysis of Data from the Oil Price Information Service 
 
What accounts for this rise in margins? In part, some increase in margins would be 
expected in a period of rising fuel prices. For example, charges to vendors from credit cards 
would rise as the price of gasoline rises. For illustration purposes (actual charges may differ), 
assuming a service charge of 3%, the charges for a credit sale would move from $0.06 per gallon 
to $0.09 per gallon as gasoline prices move from $2 to $3 per gallon. This cost alone may 
explain a significant portion of the increase in margins in a rising market. Another factor is that 
the wholesale cost of fuel delivered to a retailer may rise faster than rack prices.  
Such factors would be expected to lead to increased margins, but they may not explain 
the entire $0.11 increase in margins on average across the 20 cities (or the $0.13 increase 
nationwide). For example, as is illustrated in Figure 3.4, average margins for diesel fuel in 
aggregate across the 20 Nebraska cities were only $0.05 higher in August 15, 2004 to October 
30, 2005 compared with a year earlier.  
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We examine unleaded gasoline price changes during the period in more detail in order to 
learn more about why margins rose in the 20 Nebraska cities. It should be noted that the rise in 
margins in the Nebraska cities was similar to the aggregate increase nationwide. As was evident 
in Figure 3.1, the period is characterized by significant fluctuation in rack prices. The elevated 
margins in various communities arose as retail prices reacted to changes in rack prices. The types 
of reactions differed by community. We illustrate this by examining both upward and downward 
price trends during the period in the next section. 
 
Figure 3.4
Change in Retail and Rack Prices and Margins 
for Diesel Fuel 
Aug. 15-Oct. 31 Period 2004 Versus 2005 
Aggregate for 20 NE Cities
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Source: Task Force Analysis of Data from the Oil Price Information Service 
 
IV. Price Trends by City 
A. Upward Price Trends in Nebraska Cities 
 Data in Table 3.3 show the date and amount for peak prices in 15 Nebraska cities. There 
was insufficient data for this analysis in the other five cities. The first column shows the peak 
day for average rack prices in each city. The second column shows the peak day for average 
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retail prices in each city. The third column shows the difference between the peak average retail 
price in each city and the peak average rack price (adjusted by a fixed $0.46 to account for taxes 
and a freight charge). The data indicate that in most cities the peak average retail price was 
between $0.00 and $0.10 greater than the average peak rack price (after adjusting to account for 
taxes). The average retail price typically peaked a few days after the average rack price peaked. 
This suggests that in most cities the peak daily average retail price charged was in line with (or 
even less than) what would be required based on the peak daily average rack prices plus a typical 
margin (roughly $0.10). However, in Omaha, Lincoln (after Katrina only), Sidney, and Ogallala, 
the peak average retail price was somewhat higher than rack prices, suggesting that retailers in 
those cities were able to capture higher margins during these periods.  
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Table 3.3 Retail and Wholesale Price Spikes in Post-Hurricane Periods 
City 
Date of Peak Average 
Rack Price 
Date of Peak Average 
Retail Price 
Difference Between 
Peak Retail and Peak 
Rack Prices (adjusted 
for taxes)  
Early September    
   United States Sept 2, 2005 Sept 2, 2005 $0.16 
   Omaha Sept 1, 2005        Sept 3, 2005     $0.27 
   Lincoln Sept 2, 2005        Sept 2, 2005     $0.23 
   Grand Island Sept 2, 2005        Sept 4, 2005     $0.10 
   North Platte Sept 2, 2005         Sept 3, 2005     $0.08 
   Columbus Sept 1, 2005        Sept 3, 2005     $0.01 
   Kearney Sept 1, 2005     Sept 2, 2005 -$0.01 
   Sidney Sept 2, 2005        Sept 7, 2005     $0.19 
   Scottsbluff Sept 1, 2005        Sept 3, 2005  $0.01 
   Ogallala Sept 2, 2005        Sept 5, 2005  $0.15 
   Beatrice Sept 1, 2005        Sept 2, 2005     $0.04 
   Alliance Aug. 31, 2005     Sept 4, 2005 $0.05 
   Broken Bow Sept 2, 2005        Sept 2, 2005  $0.07 
   S. Sioux City Sept 2, 2005  Sept 2, 2005  $0.14 
   Norfolk Sept 1, 2005      Sept 2, 2005  $0.10 
    
Late September/ Early October   
   United States Sept 29, 2005 Oct 1, 2005 $0.04 
   Omaha Sept 29, 2005       Sept 29, 2005    $0.11 
    Lincoln Sept 29, 2005       Oct 1, 2005  $0.05 
    Grand Island Sept 29, 2005       Sept 30, 2005  $0.01 
    North Platte Sept 29, 2005      Oct 2, 2005    -$0.01 
    Columbus Sept 29, 2005      Oct 2, 2005   -$0.01 
    Kearney Sept 29, 2005      Oct 1, 2005    $0.06 
    Sidney Sept 29, 2005      Oct 4, 20051   $0.291
    Scottsbluff Sept 29, 2005      Oct 3, 2005  $0.09 
    Ogallala Sept 29, 2005      Oct 1, 2005 $0.11 
    Beatrice Sept 29, 2005      Oct 3, 2005 $0.05 
    Alliance Sept 29, 2005      Sept 30, 2005 $0.09 
    Broken Bow Sept 29, 2005      Sept 30, 2005 $0.04 
    S. Sioux City Sept 29, 2005      Oct 8, 2005 $0.03 
    Norfolk Sept 29, 2005      Oct 1, 2005 $0.03 
Source: Task Force Analysis of Data from the Oil Price Information Service 
1 Result significantly influenced by the particular stations reporting on October 4th. Difference would have been 
$0.15 if based on October 2, October 3, October 5, or October 6.  
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B. Downward Price Trends in Nebraska Cities 
 Table 3.4 below shows how quickly retail and rack prices dropped from peak levels after 
the two price spikes illustrated in Table 3.3. Average rack prices fell $0.60 to $0.70 in each 
community two weeks after peaking. But there was great variation in how far retail prices fell. 
Retail prices in Omaha dropped as rapidly as rack prices after the price spikes. Margins 
did not grow as rack and retail prices began to fall. By contrast, margins earned in Lincoln 
during the price spike period grew further as rack prices began to fall. In particular, retail prices 
did not fall as rapidly as rack prices. In economics parlance, retail gasoline prices were sticky in 
a downward direction in Lincoln. Uncertainties as to the future direction in wholesale price, 
coupled with the desire to recoup the higher costs of existing inventory, may help to explain this 
downward stickiness. This sticky downward pattern was even more pronounced in smaller 
Nebraska cities and for the United States overall. Recall that retail outlets in many of these cities 
had retail prices in line with rack prices (adjusted for taxes) during the two price spikes (see 
Table 3.3). Retail prices fell less sharply and, in some cases, much less sharply than rack prices. 
In these cities, sticky downward prices are what generated the jump in margins documented in 
Table 3.2. Again, this pattern was not unique to Nebraska cities, but was also found nationwide. 
Table 3.4 Decline in Retail and Rack Prices Following Two Price Spikes 
Decline in Retail Prices  
Relative to Decline in Rack Prices 
 
Cities 
95% to 99%1 Omaha 
80% to 94% Lincoln 
60% to 79% Grand Island, Columbus, Sidney, Norfolk 
35% to 59% United States, North Platte, Kearney, Beatrice, 
Scottsbluff, Alliance, Ogallala Broken Bow, 
South Sioux City 
Source: Task Force Analysis of Data from the Oil Price Information Service 
1 For example, 99% would imply that if rack prices fell $1.00 two weeks after their peak, then 
retail prices would have fallen by $0.99 two weeks after their peak.  
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C. Summary by City 
 Table 3.2 indicated that gasoline retailers on average earned higher margins in each of 19 
Nebraska cities during the August 15, 2005 to October 31, 2005 period as fuel prices first 
increased sharply and then declined in reaction to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Our analysis 
indicates that in many cities the retailers on average earned these higher margins not as prices 
peaked in reaction to the Hurricane, but in the period when retail and wholesale prices were 
falling. Retail prices were sticky in most cities, not falling as quickly as rack prices. Omaha 
stations appeared to earn higher-than-average margins during the peak period. Omaha margins, 
however, did not grow as prices fell. Retailers in Lincoln also earned higher-than-average 
margins during the peak period, and these margins only grew modestly as prices fell. 
V. Price Trend by Brands 
 The preceding analysis focused mostly on average prices. Naturally some stations would 
have earned more (or less) than the average margins reported above. We also examined average 
margins by brand for 1) the entire August 15 to October 31 period, and 2) for the peak price 
increase periods after Hurricane Katrina from August 28-September 3. For the entire two and 
one-half month period there was little difference between the average margins of brands. The 
lowest average margin was $0.18 and the highest margin was $0.25.  
There were greater differences during the peak price increase period from August 28 
through September 3. Brands with the highest rack prices for gasoline earned very low margins 
(from -$0.04 to +$0.10, depending on whether margins were calculated using same-day rack 
prices or one or two days earlier - thus reflecting a time lag to deplete existing inventory. On the 
higher end, one brand earned margins during the period from $0.24 to $0.36 per gallon, again 
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depending on how margins were calculated. This suggests that individual retailers did not base 
costs simply on rack or wholesale prices plus a margin, but instead based prices on what the 
market would bear. This led to higher margins for retailers selling brands with relatively low 
rack prices, but to low or negative margins for retailers that paid high rack prices. 
 Another way to see this same point is to correlate rack prices with the retail prices for the 
different brands. We examined this correlation during the period of rapid price increases 
following Hurricane Katrina through September 3. During that period, retail prices across all 
brands rose as rack prices increased. On any individual day, however, there was no correlation 
(or even a negative correlation) between average retail prices charged by a brand and the rack 
prices paid by that brand. In other words, the brands that paid higher rack prices did not charge 
higher retail prices and perhaps charged lower prices. This was true whether brand retail price 
averages were correlated with brand rack prices from the same day or from previous days. 
 Another issue is whether there were individual stations, or whole brands, that led retail 
prices upward or downward in individual cities. For example, in Omaha, there was little 
cohesion in which stations were leading prices upward (i.e., consistently charging above average 
prices on days when prices were rising). A variety of individual stations consistently led prices 
upward as prices rose rapidly during the August 30 to September 1 period. On the other hand, 
there was more cohesion in which stations lead the downward march in prices. A number of 
retail chains selling a single brand of gasoline led prices downward as prices fell in Omaha from 
September 7 to September 18. Retail prices of these stations were regularly lower than Omaha 
averages during the period, even though rack prices as reported by OPIS for the brand were no 
different than those for other brands in Omaha.  
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 Looking at other cities, there was little pattern among the brands leading prices upward 
and downward. Individual stations from a variety of brands tended to lead prices in any 
particular city. Further, there was no brand that regularly led prices upward or downward in the 
individual cities. 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
        
AL Sale or rental of 
any commodity 
or rental facility  
Ala. Code § 
8-31-3 et 
seq. 
Declaration of a state 
emergency 
No seller may 
impose an 
unconscionable 
price (exceeding 
by 25% or more 
the price for 
same or similar 
commodity 30 
days prior to 
emergency). 
 None $1,000 per 
violation, not 
to exceed 
$25,000 per 
24 hour 
period. (§8-
31-5) 
State Attorney 
General or 
District Attorney. 
No private cause 
of action. 
AR Vital and 
necessary 
goods or 
services, 
including 
housing, 
transportation. 
Ark. Code 
4-88-301 et 
seq. 
Declaration of a state 
emergency by the 
President, Governor, 
or local official or 
red condition by the 
U.S. Dept. of 
Homeland Security. 
No price may be 
raised more than 
10% above the 
price charged 
immediately 
prior to the 
declaration. 
Increases in 
price directly 
attributable to 
additional 
costs of 
supply, labor 
or materials. 
Class A 
misdemeanor. 
More severe 
penalties may 
be imposed 
by the AG or 
local 
ordinance. 
State Attorney 
General and/or 
private individual 
CA Goods and 
services vital 
and necessary 
for the health, 
safety, and 
welfare of 
consumers. 
Cal. Penal 
Code §396 
Declaration of state 
emergency by 
President, Governor 
or county or City 
Executive Officer.  
No price may be 
raised more than 
10% above the 
price charged 
immediately 
prior to the 
declaration (30 
days for goods, 
180 for repair 
and 
reconstruction 
services). 
Increases in 
price directly 
attributable to 
additional 
costs of 
supply, labor 
or materials. 
$2,500 per 
violation, plus 
injunction and 
restitution. 
Misdemeanor 
- up to one 
year in jail or 
$10,000 or 
both. 
State Attorney 
General, District 
Attorney, City 
Attorney, or City 
Prosecutors. 
Private parties can 
get an injunction 
and restitution but 
no civil penalties. 
CT Goods and 
services and 
Petroleum 
Products 
Conn. Gen. 
Stat. 42-230 
-232 
Regulation 
Conn. 
Agencies 
Reg. 42-
110b-29 
In the course of an 
abnormal market 
disruption.  
No seller may 
sell at a price 
which exceeds 
the price of such 
product or 
service, in the 
usual course of 
business, 
immediately 
prior to the 
declaration of 
the emergency 
Increase in 
price 
attributable to 
additional 
costs in 
connection 
with the 
acquisition, 
production, 
distribution or 
sale of 
product or 
service. 
Up to $5,000 
per violation 
(for repeated 
violations) or 
imprisonment 
up to one 
year, or both.  
State Attorney 
General 
                                                 
* Adapted from National Conference of State Legislatures, Energy and Electric Utilities, State Laws and 
Regulations: Price Gouging (10/8/2004), available online at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/energy/lawsgouging.htm (visited 11/14/2005). 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
DC Any 
merchandise or 
service sold 
during a state of 
emergency. 
D.C. Code. 
Ann. §28-
4101 to 
4103 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
mayor.  
No seller may 
charge more 
than the normal 
average retail 
price (within 
10% from price 
charged for same 
goods 90 days 
before 
emergency). 
None Maximum 
fine of $1,000 
and/or 
revocation of 
license 
permit. 
DC Attorney 
General 
FL Rental or sale 
of essential 
commodities 
Fla. Stat. 
Ann. 
501.160 and 
501.160. 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency. 
Prohibition of 
unconscionable 
prices - gross 
disparity 
between current 
price and 
average price 30 
days prior to 
emergency.  
Increase in 
price 
attributable to 
additional 
costs in 
connection 
with the rental 
or sale of the 
commodity… 
or national or 
international 
market trends. 
$1,000 per 
violation, up 
to $25,000 for 
multiple 
violations 
within 24 
hours period.  
State Attorney 
General, local 
state attorney, 
Dept. of 
Agriculture and 
Consumer 
Services 
GA Goods or 
services 
necessary to 
preserve, 
protect, or 
sustain the life, 
health, or safety 
of persons or 
property 
OCGA 10-
1-393.4; 
OCGA 10-
1-438 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
Governor. 
It is unlawful to 
sell or offer for 
sale any goods 
(defined in B) at 
a price higher 
than the price 
immediately 
prior to the 
declaration of 
emergency. 
Increase in 
price due to 
an increase in 
the cost of 
supply and 
transportation.  
$5,000 per 
violation, 
with a 
possible 
additional 
penalty of up 
to $10,000 for 
a disaster 
related 
violation. 
Governor’s Office 
of Consumer 
Affairs 
HI Rental or sale 
of essential 
commodities 
HRS 209-9; 
480-3.1 
Declaration of a state 
of disaster by the 
Governor, or when 
the state is subject to 
a “severe weather 
warning.” 
Any increase in 
price in the area 
subject to the 
declaration of 
disaster. 
Additional 
operating 
expenses 
incurred 
because of the 
state disaster, 
and which can 
be 
documented. 
$500-$10,000 
per violation. 
Hawaii Office of 
Consumer 
Protection 
ID Water, food, 
fuel, or 
pharmaceuticals 
Idaho Code 
§48-603 
(19); §48-
604 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
Governor or 
President. 
A seller of the 
four items 
mentioned may 
not charge 
exorbitant or 
excessive prices 
(comparison of 
the prices of 
goods 
immediately 
before and after 
the disaster). 
Additional 
costs of doing 
business 
incurred 
because of the 
disaster or 
emergency. 
$5,000 per 
violation, 
restitution, 
and injunctive 
relief. 
State Attorney 
General 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
IN Sale of fuel Ind. Code 
4.6-9.1 et 
seq. 
The period during 
which an emergency 
is declared and 24 
hours before the 
declaration by the 
Governor. 
The price of fuel 
is 
unconscionable 
if it exceeds the 
average price at 
which fuel was 
readily available 
during the 7 
days 
immediately 
before the 
declaration of 
emergency. 
The increase 
in price 
attributable to 
cost factors to 
the retailer, 
including 
replacement 
costs, taxes, 
and 
transportation 
costs 
incurred. 
Injunctive 
relief, 
restitution, 
and civil 
penalties of 
$1,000 per 
violation. 
State Attorney 
General 
IA Merchandise 
needed by 
disaster victims 
Iowa Code 
63.31.1 
(714); IC 
714.16(2) 
During time of 
disaster and 
subsequent recovery 
(60 day max), in a 
declared disaster 
zone. 
A seller may not 
charge an 
excessive price. 
Increase in 
price may be 
justified by 
actual costs of 
acquiring, 
producing, 
selling, 
transporting, 
and delivering 
products sold, 
plus a 
reasonable 
profit. 
Up to $40,000 
per violation, 
plus 
additional 
$5,000 if 
elderly was 
defrauded; 
restitution, 
injunctive 
relief. 
State Attorney 
General 
KS Merchandise 
needed by 
disaster victims 
Kan. Stat. 
50-6,106 
Kan Stat. 
50-627 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
US President or 
Governor, during the 
time such state is in 
effect, or thirty days 
after the occurrence 
of the event that 
triggered the 
declaration. 50-627 
does not require 
emergency but 
relates to market 
price at any time. 
Price may not 
grossly exceed 
(unconscionable) 
the price of the 
same good 1 day 
before disaster 
or the price 
charged for same 
or similar good 
by other sellers 
in the area. An 
increase of more 
than 25% is 
prima facie 
evidence of 
gross excess.  
Additional 
costs incurred 
in connection 
with the sale 
of the product 
or service  
$10,000 per 
violation, 
additional 
$10,000 if 
elderly or 
disabled was 
defrauded; 
restitution, 
injunctive 
relief. 
State Attorney 
General or 
District/County 
Attorney 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
KY Any repair or 
reconstruction 
service; 
consumer food 
items; 
emergency 
cleanup goods 
or services; 
emergency 
supplies; 
medical 
supplies; home 
heating oil; 
building 
materials; 
housing; 
transportation, 
freight and 
storage 
services; 
gasoline and 
motor fuels 
Ky. Rev. 
Stat. 367-
372 to -378 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
Governor, Condition 
Red by U.S. 
Department of 
Homeland Security. 
Prohibition on 
charging a price 
grossly in excess 
of price before 
triggering event 
and unrelated to 
increased costs 
to seller.  
Increased 
costs to seller. 
$5,000 for 
first offense; 
$10,000 for 
subsequent 
offenses; 
additional 
remedies such 
as injunctive 
relief and 
restitution. 
State Attorney 
General 
LA Goods and 
services 
LSA-R.S. 
29:732; 
LSA-R.S. 
29:734; 
LSA-R.S. 
14:329.6 
and 
14:329.7 
Declaration of 
emergency by the 
Governor or Parish 
President. 
The value for 
goods and 
services may not 
exceed prices 
ordinarily 
charged. Must 
prove a gross 
disparity 
between the 
price of the 
goods or 
services prior to 
the event or that 
the amount 
charged grossly 
exceed the price 
at which the 
same or similar 
goods or 
services were 
readily 
obtainable in the 
trade area. 
Reasonable 
expenses and 
a charge for 
any attendant 
business risk, 
in addition to 
the cost of the 
goods and 
services 
which 
necessarily 
are incurred 
in procuring 
the goods and 
services 
during the 
state of 
emergency. 
Injunctive 
action, with 
possible civil 
penalties and 
restitution to 
aggrieved 
consumers. 
When 
violation 
results in 
serious bodily 
injury or 
property 
damage in 
excess of 
$5,000, 
imprisonment 
at hard labor 
for not more 
than 5 years. 
Violations 
resulting in 
death - 
imprisonment 
not exceeding 
21 years. 
Attorney General, 
District Attorney, 
or Parish Attorney 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
ME Necessities of 
life (including 
fuel) under the 
profiteering 
statute (Title 
10). All goods 
or services 
under Title 5. 
10 M.R.S.A. 
§1105; 5 
M.R.S.A. 
§207  
No triggering event 
needed.  
Prohibits unjust 
or unreasonable 
profits in the 
sale, exchange 
or handling of 
necessities.  
None $10,000 under 
5 M.R.S.A. 
§207; $1,000 
or 3 years 
imprisonment 
under 10 
M.R.S.A. 
§1105. 
Maine Attorney 
General. Private 
enforcement 
available under 
the UTPA 
MA Petroleum 
products 
Regulation 
940 CMR 
3.18 
Any market 
emergency/disruption 
It is unfair and 
deceptive to sell 
at an 
unconscionably 
high price (gross 
disparity as 
compared to the 
price in the 
regular course of 
business). 
Increased 
wholesale 
costs. 
$5,000 per 
violation. 
State Attorney 
General. Private 
enforcement 
available. 
MI Property or 
services 
MCL 
445.903 
(1)(z) 
Not specifically 
targeted at 
disaster/gouging. 
Prohibits 
charging a price 
in gross excess 
of the price for 
which similar 
products or 
services are sold. 
None Up to $25,000 State Attorney 
General 
MS Any goods and 
services sold 
within the 
designated 
emergency area 
Miss. Code 
§75-24-25 
Disaster declared by 
the Governor 
It is a crime 
(misdemeanor or 
felony) to charge 
prices exceeding 
those ordinarily 
charged for 
comparable 
goods or 
services in the 
same market 
area at or 
immediately 
before the 
declaration of a 
state of 
emergency. 
Any 
expenses, the 
cost of the 
goods and 
services 
incurred in 
procuring 
such goods 
and services. 
Misdemeanor: 
up to $1,000 
and 6 months. 
Felony: 1 to 5 
years and up 
to $5,000 
State Attorney 
General 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
MO Any necessity 
including those 
likely to be 
provided w/in 
the area 
Regulation 
15 CSR 60-
8.0101 et 
seq. 
Disaster area 
declared by the 
Governor 
It is an unfair 
practice to take 
advantage of a 
person’s 
impairment or 
hardship or 
charge an 
excessive price. 
Actual cost of 
acquiring, 
producing, 
selling, 
transporting 
and delivering 
the actual 
product sold 
plus the 
seller’s usual 
and 
customary 
profit margin 
prior to the 
onset of the 
natural 
disaster. 
$1,000 per 
violation, 
injunctive 
relief, 
restitution. 
A knowing 
violation is a 
Class D 
felony. 
State Attorney 
General, Local 
prosecutor, 
Private cause of 
action. 
NJ Any 
merchandise 
used as a direct 
result of 
emergency or 
used to 
preserve, 
protect or 
sustain life, 
health, safety or 
comfort 
N.J.S.A. 
56:8-107 to 
8:109 
Declaration of 
emergency by the US 
President or the 
Governor 
Prohibition of 
excessive price 
increase (as 
compared to the 
price in the usual 
course of 
business 
immediately 
prior to the 
disaster. A more 
than 10% 
increase is 
deemed to be 
excessive) 
during or within 
30 days of the 
termination of 
declared “state 
of emergency.” 
The price 
attributable to 
additional 
costs imposed 
by the seller’s 
supplier or 
other costs of 
providing the 
good or 
service during 
the state of 
emergency. 
Up to $10,000 
for first 
violation; up 
to $20,000 for 
subsequent 
violations. 
State Attorney 
General; Private 
Right of Action 
NY Consumer 
goods and 
services vital 
for health, 
safety, and 
welfare of 
consumers 
Statute NY 
Gen Bus 
396-R 
During market 
disruptions 
It is unlawful to 
charge an 
unconscionably 
excessive price 
(a gross disparity 
between the 
current price and 
the in the usual 
course of 
business 
immediately 
prior to the onset 
of the abnormal 
disruption of the 
market. 
 Additional 
costs not 
within the 
control of the 
defendant, 
imposed on 
the defendant 
for the goods 
or services. 
Up to 
$10,000. 
Restitution. 
State Attorney 
General 
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
NC Any 
merchandise or 
service 
consumed or 
used as a direct 
result of an 
emergency or 
which are 
consumed or 
used to 
preserve, 
protect, or 
sustain life, 
health, safety, 
or comfort of 
persons or their 
property 
NCGS §75-
38 
Declaration of state 
of disaster 
It is unlawful to 
charge a price 
that is 
unreasonably 
excessive. 
The price 
charged by 
the seller is 
attributable to 
additional 
costs imposed 
by the seller’s 
supplier or 
other costs of 
providing the 
good or 
service during 
the state of 
disaster. 
$5,000 per 
violation. 
State Attorney 
General and/or 
private individual 
OK Goods, 
services, 
dwelling or 
storage space 
Statute 15 
OK Code 
777.4 
Declaration of 
emergency by the 
President or the 
Governor 
No sale lease or 
rental at more 
than 10% above 
the price charged 
immediately 
prior. 
Not a 
violation if 
the increase in 
the price is 
attributable to 
factors 
unrelated to 
the 
emergency 
and does not 
include any 
increase in 
profit to the 
seller or 
owner. 
Up to $10,000 
per violation 
plus 
reasonable 
costs. 
Misdemeanor: 
up to $1,000 
and/or 1 year 
in jail. 
Felony: up to 
$5,000 and/or 
10 years in 
jail. 
Attorney General 
or District 
Attorney as 
violation of the 
Consumer 
Protection Act (15 
O.S. 751)  
SC Goods, 
services, 
materials, 
merchandise, 
supplies, 
equipment, 
resources, or 
other articles of 
commerce for 
consumption or 
use as a direct 
result of a 
declared state 
of emergency 
S.C. Code 
Ann. §39-5-
145 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency by the 
Governor, or 
declaration of 
disaster by the 
President concerning 
all or a portion of the 
state. 
May not sell at a 
price that is 
unconscionable 
(grossly exceeds 
the average cost 
of the 
commodity 
during the 30-
day period 
preceding the 
emergency). 
Not a 
violation if 
the increase in 
price is 
attributable to 
additional 
costs incurred 
in connection 
with the rental 
or sale of the 
commodity, 
or regional, 
national, or 
international 
market trends. 
Civil penalty 
of $5,000 per 
violation. If 
an injunction 
is issued, a 
violator is 
subject to a 
fine of 
$15,000 for 
each violation 
of the 
injunction. In 
addition, 
violation of 
§39-5-145 is a 
misdemeanor, 
punishable 
with a fine of 
$1,000, 
imprisonment 
of up to 30 
days, or both. 
Local solicitor 
(district attorney) 
or Attorney 
General  
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
TN Any consumer 
food item; 
repair or 
construction 
services; 
emergency 
supplies; 
medical 
supplies; 
building 
materials; 
gasoline; 
transportation; 
freight and 
storage; or 
housing 
TCA 47-18-
5101 et seq.  
Declaration of a state 
of emergency and 
until the state of 
emergency is 
terminated. 
It is unlawful to 
charge a price 
that is grossly in 
excess of the 
price charged for 
the same or 
similar goods or 
services in the 
usual course of 
business 
immediately 
prior to the 
events giving 
rise to the state 
of emergency. 
The increase 
was directly 
attributable to 
additional 
costs imposed 
on it by the 
supplier of the 
goods or 
services, or 
was directly 
attributable to 
additional 
costs for labor 
or materials 
used to 
provide the 
goods or 
services.  
 $1,000 per 
violation. 
State Attorney 
General 
TX Food, fuel, 
medicine, or 
other 
necessities 
Tex. Bus & 
Com. Code 
Ann. 
17.46(b)(27) 
Declaration of 
disaster by the 
Governor 
It is unlawful to 
charge 
exorbitant or 
excessive prices. 
 Up to $20,000 
per violation. 
State Attorney 
General, District 
Attorney, or 
County Attorney  
VA Sale, lease or 
license of 
necessary 
goods or 
services 
Va. Code 
§§59.1-525 
through 529 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency  
No supplier may 
sell, lease or 
license 
necessary goods 
or services at an 
unconscionable 
price (the price 
which grossly 
exceeds the price 
charged for same 
or similar goods 
during the 10 
days 
immediately 
prior to the 
disaster) 
Additional 
costs in 
connection 
with the sale 
of the goods 
or services, 
including 
costs imposed 
by the source, 
during the 
time of 
disaster. 
Up to $2,500 
per willful 
violation.  
State Attorney 
General, 
Commonwealth’s 
Attorneys, City, 
Town, and 
County Attorneys  
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State Covered  Authority Triggering Event  Prohibited Acts Safe Harbors  Penalties Enforced By 
WV Goods or 
services that are 
vital and 
necessary for 
the health, 
safety, and 
welfare of 
consumers 
W.V. Code 
46A-6J-1 
through 3 
Declaration of a state 
of emergency 
It is unlawful to 
sell items at a 
10% increase 
over the price 10 
days before the 
declaration of a 
state of 
emergency. 
Increase in 
price directly 
attributable to 
additional 
costs imposed 
by supplier of 
goods or 
additional 
costs for labor 
or materials 
used to 
provide the 
services 
(provided 
price is no 
greater than 
10% above 
total cost to 
the seller plus 
markup 
customarily 
applied for 
that good or 
service in the 
usual course 
of business on 
tenth day 
preceding 
declaration). 
Misdemeanor 
– up to $1,000 
or one year 
imprisonment, 
or both.  
State Attorney 
General 
 
 
